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ABSTRACT 
 This Article offers a theory of international civil disobedience 
under which a state could stage an unlawful military intervention 
to stop massive human rights abuses without sacrificing its respect 
for the rule of international law—if the intervention conformed to 
the characteristics that distinguish international civil disobedience 
from other types of illegal conduct.  These are publicity, 
conscientiousness, a preference for non-violence, and willingness to 
accept the legal consequences of the disobedient act.  These 
requirements collectively set an appropriately high bar for the use of 
force outside the constraints of the Charter of the United Nations.  A 
state meeting that bar, however, would have a claim to moral 
standing unavailable to other violators of the prohibition of the use 
of force. 
 The demands of public morality and the demands of international 
law conflict in cases where the former compels military intervention 
to end mass atrocities and the latter forbids that intervention.  On 
most accounts, concerned states would therefore be forced to choose 
between two unattractive options.  Violating the prohibition of the 
use of force would weaken a foundational norm of the modern 
international system and undermine the claim of international law 
to be able to constrain the behavior of states.  Refraining from 
intervening despite strong moral reasons to do so would de-legitimize 
international law, showing it to be a system unable to implement the 
fundamental principles on which it claims to be based.  This Article 
offers a potential solution to that dilemma. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
[A]n individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is 
unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in 
order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is 
in reality expressing the highest respect for law.   
 
Martin Luther King, Jr.1 
 
This Article argues that states motivated to use military force to 
stop massive human rights violations but loath to violate international 
law do not need to choose between saving lives and upholding the 
rule of law.  Rather, states can do both by engaging in a kind of 
principled disregard of the law.  This Article will refer to that 
principled disregard as “international civil disobedience” but will 
acknowledge that the dissimilarities between the domestic and 
international context are such that the term “civil disobedience” may 
work more as an analogy than by direct application. 
Consider three contrasting scenarios.  In the first, a government 
rains horror down on the civilians entrusted to its care.  Hundreds of 
thousands are killed.  Shopkeepers are choked on poison gas, 
schoolteachers tortured to death, and farmers bombed to dust by the 
very authorities charged with protecting their human rights.  Millions 
run from their homes.  In response, the United States seeks 
authorization for military intervention from the United Nations 
Security Council but the Security Council rejects the request.  
Nonetheless, the United States—perhaps with some allies, perhaps 
not—attacks the offending regime intending to end, or at least 
significantly curb, the violence.  But in so doing it contravenes, and 
thereby undermines, one of the bedrock norms of international law—
the prohibition on the use of force.  This hypothetical scenario is, of 
course, not dissimilar from what almost happened in Syria in late 
20132 (and what, arguably, is happening at the end of 2014),3 when 
                                                        
 1.  Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963). 
 2.  Anne Gearan, Diplomacy Is Failing in Syria, Obama Acknowledges, WASH. POST (Feb. 
11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/diplomacy-is-failing-
in-syria-obama-acknowledges/2014/02/11/822065e6-935c-11e3-84e1-
27626c5ef5fb_story.html. 
 3.  At the time of this writing, the United States is conducting an air campaign against 
a rebel group—variously referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant—in Syria.  See, e.g., U.S., Allies Launch Barrage of 
Airstrikes Against Islamic State, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-mideast-crisis-usa-airstrikes-
idUSKCN0IU1KU20141110.  While the legality of particular military operations is beyond 
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the Obama administration called for military intervention in the 
Syrian civil war, notwithstanding the impossibility of authorization 
from the Security Council.4 
Although calling for an attack that would violate the prohibition 
on the use of force under the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. 
Charter”),5 the Obama administration never offered a legal 
justification.  Nor did it clarify how its calls for Syrian accountability to 
international legal standards squared with its own apparent intention 
to violate one of the most important of those standards.  For those 
concerned with the legitimacy and integrity of international law, with 
the reputation of the United States and its ability to conduct foreign 
policy, or with the consequences of weakening the legal prohibition 
on the use of force, leaving the issue unresolved in that way was, and 
is, deeply troubling. 
In the second, very real, scenario, genocide was brewing in 
Rwanda. Agents on the ground informed the United States, the 
United Nations, and other powerful members of the international 
community of the impending catastrophe.6  Yet they did nothing.  
Genocidaires butchered nearly a million people in the space of 100 
days.7  Remorseful participants and meticulous researchers later 
exposed the political calculus behind the Clinton administration’s 
refusal to intervene, to the enduring shame of the United States.8  
                                                        
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that the argument presented herein focuses on 
military intervention in internal conflict.  When more than one state is involved, as with 
ISIS, which operates in both Syria and Iraq, the analysis changes.  It is possible to argue, 
for instance, that Iraq’s invitation to the United States to participate in its self-defense 
against ISIS includes a limited right to pursue ISIS forces within Syria.  See, e.g., Ryan 
Goodman, International Law on Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 28, 
2014), http://justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-airstrikes-isis-syria/. 
 4.  Mark Landler, David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Obama Set for Limited Strike on 
Syria as British Vote No, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/obama-
syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 5.  See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 6.  General Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian military commander of the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, repeatedly warned of impending disaster.  In one of his 
most famous communications, the “genocide fax,” he wrote about an informant who 
reported that “he ha[d] been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali.  He suspects it is for 
their extermination.  Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up 
to 1000 Tutsis.”  Michael Dobbs, The Rwanda “Genocide Fax,” #RWANDA20YRS (Jan. 9, 2014), 
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB452/; see also ROMÉO 
DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004). 
 7.  Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm. 
 8.  MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
RWANDA 71, 143–44 (2002); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND 
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Two decades later, the region remains in conflict spurred and 
maintained in part by regional and international dynamics emerging 
from the genocide.9 
To date the two options described in the foregoing scenarios 
have been the only ones open to any potential intervener concerned 
to uphold international law yet faced with both massive human rights 
abuses and an intransigent Security Council.  Law-abiding 
interventionists in that situation face an impossible choice between 
competing moral imperatives to respect the rule of law and to stop 
atrocities.10 
This Article offers a possible third option.  Imagine that the next 
time (and there will be a next time) a government kills and tortures 
massive numbers of its own citizens while a paralyzed Security Council 
sits passively by, the United States uses military force to stop the 
atrocities notwithstanding its lack of authorization to do so.  But 
instead of leaving the issue of its unauthorized intervention 
unresolved, the United States acknowledges its responsibility under 
international law by accepting the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for disputes arising from its actions.  Imagine 
further that in any proceedings in the ICJ the United States concedes 
responsibility—acknowledges that its conduct amounted to an 
internationally wrongful act—and only contests the amount of the 
damages it might owe the opposing state.  Then the ICJ, applying the 
clean hands doctrine, finds that the state committing the atrocities 
lacks the standing to recover damages and the United States pays 
nothing.  The differences between this scenario and the cases of Syria 
and Rwanda are that the former two create a dilemma for 
international law, tarnish the reputation of the United States 
whichever path it takes, and diminish its ability to conduct effective 
                                                        
THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 334–35 (2002); Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 84, 86, 97–98.  Five years after the genocide, former President 
Clinton apologized directly to the people of Rwanda.  John Ryle, A Sorry Apology from 
Clinton, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 1998), 
http://www.theguardian.com/Columnists/Column/0,5673,234216,00.html. 
 9.  Chris McGreal, Rwanda’s Genocide and the Bloody Legacy of Anglo-American Guilt, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/12/rwanda-genocide-bloody-
legacy-angloamerican-guilt; Jason K. Stearns, Rwandan Ghosts, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 29, 
2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/29/rwandan_ghosts. 
 10.  A potential intervener unconcerned with international law, or concerned with it 
only as a suggestion to be taken up or not, would of course face no such choice.  This 
Article is not aimed at the unconcerned; rather, it assumes that states for the most part 
wish to adhere to international law and certainly to refrain from undermining its central 
tenets.  For further discussion see infra Part II.E.   
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foreign policy, while the latter solves that dilemma, preserves the 
reputation of the United States, and gives it the moral high ground in 
future debates about the appropriate use of force in defense of 
human rights. 
This Article offers a theory of international civil disobedience, or 
principled disregard of international law, which may help solve the 
dilemma that arises when egregious human rights abuses demand 
military intervention to end them but the Security Council is 
unwilling to issue legal authorization for that intervention.  States 
considering whether to intervene to stop such abuses seem to be in a 
position to act morally or legally, but not both.  Such situations pit 
one set of moral intuitions (preserve life in the face of atrocities) 
against another (uphold the rule of law). 
Both choices risk damage to the intervening state’s international 
reputation and undermine its ability to secure, in the medium and 
long term, the very legal and moral interests that underlie the 
dilemma.  Choosing to ignore moral imperatives and follow the law 
(by not intervening) would de-legitimize international law, showing it 
to be a system unable to implement the fundamental principles on 
which it claims to be based.11  Yet choosing to ignore the law and 
follow moral imperatives (by intervening) would undermine one of 
the foundational norms of modern international law by subordinating 
the prohibition of the use of force to the non-legal judgments of 
states.  That prohibition is the cornerstone of a modern international 
order which privileges diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes over violence.  In that respect the modern system is rightly 
viewed by many as a watershed in human development.  It replaced 
law permitting the waging of war as a way to vindicate states’ 
international legal rights or even to pursue their political agendas.12  
                                                        
 11.  In his retrospective on recourse to force published shortly after the NATO 
bombing of Kosovo, Tom Franck likened this result to the one where a child, forbidden by 
his father to see a neighbor boy, nonetheless saves the neighbor from drowning one 
afternoon and is severely punished for disobeying his father.  “Law—or, in this example, 
parental authority—does not thrive when its implementation produces reductio ad 
absurdum: when it grossly offends most persons’ common moral sense of what is right.”  
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED 
ATTACKS 178 (2002). 
 12.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries states enjoyed unfettered 
discretion under international law to make war for any reason or for no reason.  Before 
that, the legality of war was governed by the labyrinthine and easily manipulated jus ad 
bellum, which, among other things, allowed a state whose international legal rights had 
been infringed upon to resort to the use of force as a form of “self-help.”  The adoption of 
the U.N. Charter marked the transition from the system of self-help and the use of force as 
punishment to a system of diplomacy and the use of force as a last resort.  Gabriella Blum, 
The Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57, 63, 70, 72 (2013).  
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Choosing to intervene would also give fodder to the argument that 
international law as a system lacks the ability to ensure compliance 
and is therefore more a disguise for power than it is a kind of law.13 
This Article takes it as a given that situations horrifying enough 
to prompt calls for military intervention will continue to arise.  For 
the first several decades of the Charter era, unauthorized intervention 
was rare.14  But since the end of the Cold War, several states have 
undertaken unauthorized military interventions, including the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom in northern Iraq in 
1991;15 the decade-long ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia;16 the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 1999;17 the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003;18 the Russian attacks in Georgia in 2008;19 
and the U.S. intervention in Libya in 2011.  The United States was 
within a hair’s breadth of launching an attack on Syria before Russia 
brokered a diplomatic solution.  Although that diplomatic solution 
seems to have held, at least with respect to the United States attacking 
the state of Syria, at the time of this writing the United States is 
                                                        
 13.  David J. Bederman, Constuctivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 469, 473 (2001) (“All that matters, according to the realists (whether classical or 
structural), is power.  In their view, legalities can never constrain power.”); Claire R. Kelly, 
Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 562–63 (2004) (“Without 
guaranteed enforcement by an international sovereign, states must preserve their relative 
power or risk increasing insecurity.  There may be rules or law to which nations subscribe, 
but, as the theory goes, ultimately powerful nations will avoid complying with rules that 
diminish their relative power.”). 
 14.  See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? (2001); FRANCK, supra note 11; 
Tonny Brems Knudsen, The History of Humanitarian Intervention: The Rule or the 
Exception? 33 (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Aarhus 
University Department of Political Science and Government), available at 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p370801_index.html.  
 15.  See generally Matthew C. Cooper, A Note to States Defending Humanitarian Intervention: 
Examining Viable Arguments Before the International Court of Justice, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 167, 187 (2012); No Fly Zones: The Legal Position, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm. 
 16.  Cooper, supra note 15, at 187; Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG 
Intervention and Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. 155–62 (1993), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/. 
 17.  Cooper, supra note 15, at 190; Colum Lynch & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Explores 
Possible Legal Justifications for Strike on Syria, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-explores-possible-legal-
justifications-for-strike-on-syria/2013/08/28/0d9c6c08-0fe3-11e3-bdf6-
e4fc677d94a1_story.html. 
 18.  Lynch & DeYoung, supra note 17.  
 19.  This example may strike some readers as anomalous.  For additional discussion 
see infra note 129 and accompanying text.  
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conducting airstrikes within Syrian territory, aimed at the insurgent 
group ISIS.20 
Nor is Syria the only place where civilians are suffering massive 
human rights violations at the hands of their government.  At the end 
of 2013, reports of ethnically motivated massacres of civilians surfaced 
in South Sudan21—a country of significant strategic interest to the 
United States.22  In the Central African Republic, government-
affiliated Muslim militias initiated ethnic and religious violence which 
has spiraled out of control and brought the country to the brink of 
chaos.23  The U.S. government is increasingly taking the position that 
such atrocities are a threat to its own national security.24 
Taking future unauthorized intervention as a given, this Article 
discusses not whether it is, or can be, the right option but rather 
whether the inevitable practice can be understood in a way that has 
the least impact on either the vitality of the prohibition of the use of 
force or the legitimacy of international law.  Commentators have 
                                                        
 20.  Anne-Marie Slaughter in Davos: Middle East Diplomacy Must be Backed by Threats of 
Force, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/24/anne-marie-slaughter-davos-middle-east-
diplomacy_n_4659428.html. 
 21.  South Sudan: Ethnic Targeting, Widespread Killings, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 16, 
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespread-
killings. 
 22.  The United States has been a strong supporter of South Sudan through three 
successive Presidents.  Rebecca Hamilton, U.S. Played Key Role in Southern Sudan’s Long 
Journey to Independence, ATLANTIC (July 9, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/us-played-key-role-in-
southern-sudans-long-journey-to-independence/241660/.  The support springs from 
several key strategic and political interests, including promoting a Western-leaning, 
democratic country in a largely undemocratic region of the world; protecting the 
predominantly Christian population of the South from religious persecution by the mostly 
Muslim population of the North; protecting the overwhelmingly black African population 
of the South from the Arab-identified elites in the North; and ensuring access to South 
Sudan’s significant oil reserves.  For an excellent overview of how all these issues were at 
stake in Sudan’s Civil War, see INT’L CRISIS GRP., GOD, OIL, AND COUNTRY (2002), available 
at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-
africa/sudan/God%20Oil%20and%20Country%20Changing%20the%20Logic%20of%20
War%20in%20Sudan.pdf. 
 23.  Divya Avasthy, Central African Republic Ethnic Conflict Claims More Lives, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/central-african-republic-ethnic-conflict-
claims-more-lives-1434733. 
 24.  Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. 37 (2010) 
(statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence) (mass killing as national 
security threat); see also Michael Abramowitz & Lawrence Woocher, How Genocide Became a 
National Security Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/26/how_genocide_became_a_national_
security_threat.  
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raised several strong objections to unauthorized military 
intervention—even for humanitarian reasons.  From the political 
science perspective, there is evidence that intervention in civil wars 
prolongs rather than abbreviates those wars.25  As the war in Iraq 
amply demonstrated, military action can have unintended 
consequences.  That is true even where the intervening state has the 
best of intentions; yet many would doubt the good intentions of the 
United States and other strong, interventionist states.26  Evaluating 
those salient objections is outside the scope of this Article, which 
places itself firmly in the realm of non-ideal theory: how can 
unauthorized military intervention best fit with other permanent 
features of the international system such as the prohibition on the use 
of force and the rule of international law? 
To accomplish that, this Article will formulate a theory of 
principled disregard of international law (or international civil 
disobedience) under which an intervening state could simultaneously 
violate and uphold international law.  Part II will use the recent 
example of Syria to illustrate the dilemma that arises from the moral 
case for military intervention and the legal case against such 
intervention absent Security Council authorization.  Part III will begin 
to solve that dilemma by offering a theory of international civil 
disobedience that requires publicity, conscientiousness, a preference 
for non-violence, and acceptance of legal consequences.  Part IV will 
then provide a blueprint for a civilly disobedient military intervention 
and consider some potential objections and implications. 
II.  STOPPING ATROCITIES, RESPECTING THE RULE OF LAW: ONE OR THE 
OTHER? 
The recent example of Syria shows that sometimes military 
intervention is morally desirable but nonetheless illegal under 
                                                        
 25.  Patrick M. Regan, Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts, 46 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (2002); Ibrahim A. Elbadawi & Nicholas Sambanis, External 
Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars 10 (World Bank Working Paper Series, Mar. 18–
19, 2000), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2433.  
The increase in human suffering of a prolonged war would seem to cut against the stated 
benefits of humanitarian intervention. 
 26.  Russia and China have certainly taken the position that the United States is 
coming to the table with unclean hands.  Bernard Gwertzman, Why Russia Won’t Yield on 
Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 17, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/russian-
federation/why-russia-wont-yield-syria/p28712; Holly Yan, Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and 
China Are Standing by the Regime, CNN (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/; see 
also Noam Chomsky, Gifford Lecture at the University of Edinburgh: Illegal but Legitimate A 
Dubious Doctrine for the Times, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2005), http://youtu.be/xEvIDiVheys.   
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international law.  The United States chose not to bomb Syria in 2013, 
instead accepting a diplomatic solution that involved inspecting and 
destroying Syria’s chemical weapons.27  But the events of 201328 in 
Syria focused the attention of the world to a rare degree on related 
questions of international law and political morality: could the use of 
force by the United States against Syria be legally justified?  Morally?  
What if there were a moral justification without a legal one?  Several 
answers to those questions were offered by the Obama administration, 
its allies, and supporters of intervention from the academy and civil 
society.  Perhaps the prohibition of the use of force is not as absolute 
as is commonly believed.29  Or maybe the dysfunction of the Security 
Council, in the form of a near-certain veto by Russia and China, 
would somehow permit a member state to exercise the Council’s 
obstructed authority.30  What of humanitarian intervention to protect 
the rights of Syria’s dying and displaced civilians?31  Or punishment 
                                                        
 27.  See Anne Barnard, Syria Destroys Chemical Sites, Inspectors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/world/middleeast/syria.html (reporting on 
weapons inspectors’ confirmation that Syria’s ability to produce chemical weapons was 
destroyed, as well as the “unexpectedly robust cooperation” by Assad’s government “with a 
Russian-United States accord to dismantle his arsenal”); see also Giada Zampano, Italy Picks 
Port for Transit of Syria Chemical Weapons, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579324670785232180 
(describing the final plans for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, brought to 
international waters aboard Danish and U.S. vessels).  The prospect of an attack is not, 
however, over.  Recall that weapons inspections began in Iraq in late 2002.  Although Iraq 
cooperated with the inspectors, the American-led military coalition invaded only four 
months later.  Iraq WMD Timeline: How the Mystery Unraveled, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 15, 
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218. 
 28.  The events of 2014 present somewhat different questions.  See supra note 3. 
 29.  Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: 
International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/. 
 30.  See Jonathan Easley, Power Assails ‘Paralyzed’ U.N. in Making Case for Strike, THE HILL 
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://thehill.com/policy/international/320765-power-assails-paralyzed-
un-in-making-case-for-unilateral-military-strike (“President Obama’s ambassador to the 
United Nations on Friday laid out the administration’s case for a ‘swift, limited and 
proportionate strike’ in Syria, stressing that the United States was forced to act on its own 
because the U.N. was powerless in the face of opposition from Russia and China.”). 
 31.  See Lynch & DeYoung, supra note 17 (“French President François Hollande 
invoked the responsibility-to-protect doctrine in making his case to ‘punish those who took 
the decision to harm the innocent.’”); see also PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, 10 DOWNING 
STREET, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE BY SYRIAN REGIME: UK GOVERNMENT LEGAL POSITION 
(2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235098
/Chemical-weapon-use-by-Syrian-regime-UK-government-legal-position.pdf (“[T]he legal 
basis for military action would be humanitarian intervention; the aim is to relieve 
humanitarian suffering by deterring or disrupting the further use of chemical weapons.”). 
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for Syria’s violation of the ban on chemical weapons?32  Despite the 
moral imperative to save Syrian civilians from further harm, none of 
these theories offer adequate legal justification for an attack. 
A.  World in Progress: The Changing Dynamics of Sovereignty and the 
Case for (Occasional) Intervention 
International law is in the process of adapting to contemporary 
challenges to the foundational norm of the Charter system, which 
prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or when force is 
authorized by the Security Council (and, by extension, conforms with 
the political desires of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Russia, and China, each of which wields a veto in the 
Council).  But the pace of international legal change is measured in 
decades at its fastest.  In the meantime states are left with legal tools 
that are inadequate for addressing many, if not most, of the situations 
in which states might consider the use of force.  Thus, international 
law is shut out of the discourse on issues of global importance; and 
the design of appropriate legal doctrines is paralyzed.  The morality 
and utility of military intervention, whether authorized by the Security 
Council or not, are hotly contested.33  Certainly paper-thin 
contentions of humanitarian concern have been used as justification 
for self-interested and ultimately devastating military adventures.  
Notable in this regard are the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Russia’s 
interventions in Georgia in 2008 and the Ukraine in 2014, and 
NATO’s exercise in regime change in Libya in 2011.  Other 
interventions have met with more approval.  NATO’s air campaign in 
Kosovo, albeit unauthorized, was warmly welcomed by the majority of 
Kosovar Albanians (who continue to approve of the U.S. government 
at among the highest rates in the world).34  The operation of 
                                                        
 32.  It is imperative to note here that the ban on the stockpiling and use of chemical 
weapons arises from the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria was not a party at 
the time.  Conventional wisdom holds that the ban has risen to the level of customary 
international law.  Customary International Humanitarian Law Database: Rule 74. Chemical 
Weapons, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule74 (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).  However, no authoritative 
determination—opposable to Syria—has even been made to that effect.  See infra Part II.D. 
 33.  See generally RICHARD FALK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND LEGITIMACY WARS: 
SEEKING PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015).  I am grateful to Richard Falk 
for providing me with an early draft of his manuscript and to my colleague Burns H. 
Weston for bringing it to my attention.   
 34.  CYNTHIA ENGLISH & JULIE RAY, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA LEADS WORLD IN U.S. 
APPROVAL, GALLUP GLOBAL REP. (2010), available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/134102/sub-saharan-africa-leads-world-approval.aspx. 
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ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone35 and the defense of the Kurds 
by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France after 
Operation Desert Storm are examples of interventions that were, if 
not totally uncontroversial, better regarded than others and that 
seemed, partially at least, to achieve the humanitarian objectives they 
set out.  The increasing prominence of human rights discourse, the 
fraying of state sovereignty in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the 
concomitant rise of non-state actors, undermined the status quo.  For 
most of the Charter era, powerful states occasionally engaged in 
military diplomacy and the international community granted the 
intervention greater or lesser degrees of approval or approbation, 
thereby establishing an informal system of judgment and precedent.36 
But the stakes have been raised in two important ways which, 
although pulling in different directions, each call into question the 
continued viability of the present system for managing the 
international use of force.  The first is the rise of human rights.  Since 
the entry into force of the first major international human rights 
treaties in 1976,37 human rights have gained prominence in world 
affairs.  That trend has culminated in calls from powerless and 
powerful states alike for the use of all available measures, including 
force if necessary, to protect individuals from massive human rights 
violations perpetrated by their governments.  This is a complete 
inversion of the relative weights assigned to human rights on the one 
hand, and international peace and security on the other, in the U.N. 
Charter.  While it mentioned human rights as a guiding principle, the 
Charter and the institutional apparatus of the U.N. was 
predominantly dedicated to managing the use of force by member 
states.  The second important trend in this regard is the fraying of the 
international political order held together by the tensions of the Cold 
War.  That tension released, arbitrary borders drawn by colonial and 
imperial powers are being challenged by sub- and supra-state entities 
claiming group identities of sufficient strength and legitimacy to 
justify violent self-determination.  Unsurprisingly, religion and 
                                                        
 35.  See generally ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA 
LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU (2002). 
 36.  See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 162 (2002) (describing interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone as 
demonstrating “the reticent UN system’s increasing propensity to let regional 
organizations use force, even absent specific prior Security Council authorization, when 
that seemed the only way to respond to impending humanitarian disasters”).  
 37.  See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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ethnicity play a large role in such claims, from South Sudan to the 
former Yugoslavia, to Syria and Iraq. 
International law should constrain the power of states, restrain 
their worst impulses to visit violence and injustice on one another and 
on their citizens, and provide both practical and normative guidelines 
for peaceful coexistence.  The existing system tried to do just that, by 
outlawing what the architects of the Charter system understood as the 
main threat to international peace and security—classical interstate 
violence—and by funneling the remaining choices through the 
political preferences of the permanent members of the Security 
Council.  But that simple, blanket prohibition is inadequate today.  
To meet the new challenges posed by the demand for the protection 
of human rights and by frayed sovereignty, international law needs to 
develop a more nuanced, case-by-case approach that can provide 
answers to important questions.  Can interventions ever be justified?  
If so, what is a good intervention and what is a bad one?  Current 
international legal discourse fails to address these questions because it 
is forced into the constricting binaries of self-defense vs. aggression 
and unauthorized vs. authorized.  International lawyers therefore 
cede ground to politicians, philosophers, and political theorists in 
debates about some of the most important issues facing international 
society.  Notions such as “illegal but legitimate,” first deployed in the 
aftermath of the NATO intervention in Kosovo and recently revived 
with regard to Syria, can be read as attempts to escape the 
straightjacket of the Charter system and to regain for international 
law some of the ground it has lost.  But such attempts fall flat since 
they ultimately set aside international law as normatively inferior to 
whichever system was understood to produce the kind of legitimacy 
that could withstand illegality.  Another such escape attempt is the 
development of the principle of the responsibility to protect (“R2P”).  
But while a review of the history of R2P makes a strong case that the 
international community is developing a consensus about the need 
to, in extreme circumstances, use force to stop massive human rights 
abuses, that consensus has yet to coalesce in to legal rules.  
International law may yet incorporate R2P or some other set of 
principles that provide adequate guidance to states, but until that 
happens, the competition between the Charter rules and 
contemporary realities will continue to pose a dilemma for states.  It is 
that dilemma that this Article attempts to address, in a way that helps 
resolve the tension between the duty to uphold the rule of law and 
the duty to stop massive violations of human rights. 
  
2015] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 327 
The conflict in Syria is precisely the kind of disaster that gives rise 
to moral reasons to intervene according to the emerging consensus 
on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect.  Since 
the conflict in Syria began in March of 2011, more than 140,000 
people have reportedly been killed,38 including more than 11,000 
children.39  Children, including infants, have been targeted by 
snipers, summarily executed, and tortured.40  While many of the dead 
were fighting either for or against the Syrian regime, some estimates 
place the number of civilian dead at more than fifty percent of the 
total, or more than 71,000.41  In August of 2013, the Syrian regime 
killed nearly 1,500 civilians with poison gas.42  Credible evidence 
suggests that the Syrian regime systematically tortured, starved, and 
executed at least 11,000 people, then fabricated evidence that they 
died in hospitals.43 
For those left alive the situation is grim.  Both the regime and the 
opposition are using thirst, starvation, and homelessness as weapons 
of war.44  At the time of this writing, the Syrian civil war has produced 
                                                        
 38.  Erika Solomon, Syria’s Death Toll Now Exceeds 140,000: Activist Group, REUTERS 
(Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-syria-crisis-toll-
idUSBREA1E0HS20140215.  That number was provided by an activist group, the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights.  Id.  The United Nations stopped issuing casualty estimates 
in the summer of 2013 due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate data.  Laura Stampler, 
U.N. to Stop Updating Syria Death Toll, TIME (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/un-to-stop-updating-syria-death-toll. 
 39.  HAMIT DARDAGAN & HANA SALAMA, OXFORD RESEARCH GRP., STOLEN FUTURES: 
THE HIDDEN TOLL OF CHILD CASUALTIES IN SYRIA 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/stol
en_futures. 
 40.  Id. at 13. 
 41.  More than 140 Thousands Have Died Since the Beginning of the Syrian Revolution, 
SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 15, 2014), syriahr.com/en/ (page 
removed, on file with author).  One should note these numbers have not been 
independently verified.  See id.  However they have still been reported in news outlets.  See, 
e.g., Solomon supra note 38. 
 42.  Joby Warrick, More Than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-
says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html. 
 43.  DESMOND DE SILVA ET AL., CARTER-RUCK & CO., A REPORT INTO THE CREDIBILITY 
OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO TORTURE AND EXECUTION OF PERSONS 
INCARCERATED BY THE CURRENT SYRIAN REGIME 4–21 (Jan. 2014), available at 
http://www.carter-ruck.com/Documents/Syria_Report-January_2014.pdf.  The report 
concludes that “[t]he inquiry team is satisfied that upon the material it has reviewed there 
is clear evidence, capable of being believed by a tribunal of fact in a court of law, of 
systematic torture and killing of detained persons by the agents of the Syrian government.”  
Id. at 21.   
 44.  See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Deprival of Food, Water, 
Shelter and Medical Care—A Method of War in Syria, and a Crime Against Humanity 
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10.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria, 
including nearly 6.5 million internally displaced persons,45 and sent 
2.9 million refugees fleeing to neighboring countries.46  U.S. 
Ambassador Samantha Power remarked to the Security Council in 
February of 2014 that “[i]n Syria we are witnessing the worst 
humanitarian crisis we have seen in a generation.”47 
But Syria is not the first conflict that has generated calls for 
intervention to protect innocent civilians.  At the end of the 1990s—a 
decade marked by ethnic cleansing and rape camps in the Former 
Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, and still more ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo—the international community began to pay serious attention 
to the circumstances under which states should be called upon to use 
force to stop another state from killing and torturing its citizens.  As 
then-Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked, “[I]f humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”48 
It is sometimes difficult to recall because of the extraordinary rise 
to prominence of human rights, but at the inception of the United 
Nations they were a secondary, albeit important, concern.49  State 
sovereignty, sovereign equality, and the elimination of war as a tool of 
                                                        
(Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14224&LangI
D=E (“Numerous cases show that government and pro-government forces as well as armed 
opposition groups are impeding humanitarian relief to populations facing extreme 
deprivation, including children, women, older persons, persons with disabilities, the 
chronically sick, and civilians and persons hors combat held in detention . . . .  Apart from 
obstructing humanitarian access through sieges and tight check-points, attacks have been 
carried out to destroy harvests, kill livestock, and cut off water supplies, with the apparent 
aim of starving out the targeted populations, the experts noted.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 45.  U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Syria Crisis, 
http://syria.unocha.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2014). 
 46.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Syria Regional Refugee Response, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).  
 47.  Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Power: 
In Syria We Are Witnessing the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in a Generation, Address 
Before the Security Council Stakeout on Syria (Feb. 13, 2014), available at 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/02/14/ambassador-power-in-syria-we-are-witnessing-
the-worst-humanitarian-crisis-in-a-generation. 
 48.  KOFI A. ANNAN, “WE THE PEOPLES”: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 48 (2000) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf . 
 49.  CHESTERMAN, supra note 14, at 52–53 (quoting Fernando R. Tesón).  
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foreign policy were much more prominent.50  Since then, however, 
the plight of individual human beings faced with the implacable 
power of a state bent on doing them harm has slowly become a 
central preoccupation of the international community.  Beginning 
immediately after the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, a number 
of independent panels and commissions concluded that military 
intervention to protect civilians from harm was a legitimate exercise 
of the use of force.  The first was Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone 
(“Goldstone Commission”). The final report of the Goldstone 
Commission was the first to coin the term “illegal but legitimate,” 
which has regained currency in the debate about military intervention 
in Syria.51  Among other things, the report suggested that the NATO 
bombing of Kosovo was justified because of the long history of 
oppression of Kosovar Albanians, and that the time had come to 
revise international law and the intuitional framework of the U.N. to 
permit future humanitarian intervention.52 
The second was the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”).  In 2001 the ICISS—convened by 
Canada and including representatives of a wide range of 
governments—published its report on intervening for “human 
protection.”53 The report attempted to offer a comprehensive take on 
the legal, moral, operational and political issues at stake, and to 
reflect the widest possible range of global perspectives.54  The ICISS 
report identified an emerging moral and political principle that 
“intervention for human protection purposes, including military 
intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to 
                                                        
 50.  Id. 
 51.  THE INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000), 
available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005
CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf. 
 52.  See id. at 10 (“Experience from the NATO intervention in Kosovo suggests the 
need to close the gap between legality and legitimacy.  The Commission believes that the 
time is now ripe for the presentation of a principled framework for humanitarian 
intervention which could be used to guide future responses . . . and which could be used 
to assess claims for humanitarian intervention.”). 
 53.  INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT 2 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS], available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf . 
 54.  Id. at vii.  Note that this commission was made up of members from Australia, 
Algeria, Canada, United States, Russia, Germany, South Africa, Philippines, Switzerland, 
Guatemala, and India. Id. at 77–79.  The ICISS was established by the government of 
Canada.  INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, PAMPHLET, available 
at http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/69974_eng_175_lpi.pdf. 
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civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in 
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the 
perpetrator.”55 This principle is what the ICISS considered properly 
termed “R2P.”56 
The most important milestone in the development of the 
principles of R2P was the adoption by the United Nations General 
Assembly (“General Assembly”) of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.  
The 2005 World Summit was a meeting of representatives, including 
approximately 170 heads of state of the 191 (at the time) member 
states of the United Nations.57  The issues considered at the summit 
included, among others, collective security arrangements.58  The 
plenary concluded that both individual states and the international 
community as a whole bear the responsibility “to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.”59  The General Assembly adopted the World 
Summit outcome by consensus in October of 2005.60  Six months later 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1674 endorsing the World 
Summit version of R2P.61 
Many other reports, documents, and statements issued before 
and since the World Summit confirm the consensus that civilians 
must not be left to the less-than-tender mercies of their brutal and 
oppressive governments.62  U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and 
                                                        
 55.  ICISS, supra note 53, at 16. 
 56.  Id. at 15 (“While there is not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence 
of a new principle of customary international law, growing state and regional organization 
practice as well as Security Council precedent suggest an emerging guiding principle—
which in the Commission’s view could properly be termed ‘the responsibility to 
protect.’”). 
 57.  The 2005 World Summit, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/worldsummit_2005.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 
2014) (“The 2005 World Summit, held from 14 to 16 September at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York, brought together more than 170 Heads of State and 
Government.  It was a once-in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions in the areas 
of development, security, human rights and reform of the United Nations.”). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, 
(Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm (follow “S/RES/1674 (2006)” 
hyperlink) (“Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”). 
 62.  U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Rep. of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶¶ 199–209, U.N. DOC. A/59/565 (Dec. 
2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/59/565 (follow 
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his successor Ban Ki-moon have both publicly endorsed R2P.63  Both 
the General Assembly64 and the Secretary General65 have continued to 
be actively engaged in developing R2P principles. 
                                                        
“English” hyperlink).  The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change concluded that states could legitimately use force to protect civilians in other 
states, as a last resort, provided that the threat was sufficiently serious, the intervention 
narrowly tailored to address the threat, and the means proportional.  Id. ¶ 201.  Note that 
this panel was made up of present and former government officials and ministers.  See 
ICISS, supra note 53, at 77 (listing the panel members). 
 63.  In 2005, Annan urged a move toward R2P on the grounds that the United 
Nation’s stated principles and common interests “demand no less.”  U.N. Secretary-
General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for all: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement.  In 
2008 Ban Ki-moon took pains to note that R2P is not a western or northern intervention 
imposed on the global south.  Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary General 
Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event on ‘Responsible Sovereignty: 
International Cooperation for a Changed World,’ U.N. Press Release SG/SM/11701 (July 
15, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm; see 
also FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN 
AFRICA (1996).  In 2009 Ki-moon further stated that all 192 member states share 
responsibility in furthering the principles relating to R2P.  U.N. Secretary-General, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“All Member States, not just the 15 members of the Security 
Council, should be acutely aware of both public expectations and shared responsibilities. 
If the General Assembly is to play a leading role in shaping a United Nations response, 
then all 192 Member States should share the responsibility to make it an effective 
instrument for advancing the principles relating to the responsibility to protect . . . .”). 
 64.  The General Assembly held a debate on R2P on the 23rd, 24th, and 28th of July 
2009 in which only four countries, Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan, and Nicaragua, challenged 
R2P.  UN General Assembly Debate on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009, GLOBAL 
CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/343.  At the end of that debate the General 
Assembly decided to keep investigating R2P and has since held several informal dialogues.  
The Responsibility to Protect, G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009); 
General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to 
Protect, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-
topics/2914-general-assembly-debate-on-early-warning-assessment-and-the-responsibility-to-
protect; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
(July 12, 2011), 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-
topics/3566-general-assembly-interactive-dialogue-on-the-responsibility-to-protect; UN 
General Assembly Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, INT’L 
COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Brief%20Summary(3).pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014); 
United Nations General Assembly Holds Fifth Informal, Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to 
Protect Focusing on the Theme of State Responsibility and Prevention, INT’L COAL. FOR THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-
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Under any of the principles espoused at any time in the decade-
plus of the development of R2P, the plight of the Syrian people would 
justify intervention.  To take the words of Secretary General Annan, 
the effects of the Syrian civil war “offend[s] every precept of our 
common humanity.”66  The Assad regime in Syria has been at least as 
oppressive over at least as long a time as the Serbian regime in 
Kosovo.67  “[M]ajor harm to civilians,” such as starvation, torture, 
death, and displacement on unimaginable scales, “is [both] occurring 
[and] imminently apprehended, and the state in question is . . . itself 
the perpetrator,” as envisioned by the ICISS.68  The now-dominant 
language of the World Summit establishes a responsibility to protect 
populations from war crimes, among other things.69  Systematic 
torture, targeting civilians, and siege warfare (denial of food, drink, 
medical care, and shelter) are all war crimes under international 
law.70  So why all the sound and fury?  Why is international military 
intervention controversial? 
Because, as the remaining subsections below will show, military 
intervention remains illegal under international law without the 
authorization of the Security Council except in cases of self-defense.  
And yet, the anemic legal implementation of R2P belies the strength 
of the moral commitment that underpins the emerging consensus 
that states must not be permitted to rape, torture, and slaughter their 
citizens with impunity.  That dissonance leads to the dilemma that 
this Article seeks to address: to follow the strong moral consensus on 
R2P at the cost of our moral commitment to the rule of law, or vice 
versa?71  The following subsections will unpack the legal prohibition 
                                                        
topics/5004-united-nations-general-assembly-holds-fifth-informal-interactive-dialogue-on-
the-responsibility-to-protect.  
 65.  U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of 
the Secretary-General, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012), available at 
http://undocs.org/A/66/874; U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Subregional 
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 28, 2011), available at http://undocs.org/A/65/877; 
U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010), available at 
http://undocs.org/A/64/864. 
 66.  ANNAN, supra note 48, at 48. 
 67.  Mimi Dwyer, Think Bashar al-Assad Is Brutal? Meet His Family, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 
8, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114630/bashar-al-assad-syria-family-guide.  
 68.  See ICISS, supra note 53, at 16. 
 69.  2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 59, ¶ 138. 
 70.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].   
 71.  That tension is not lost on concerned observers of the crisis in Syria, and many 
prominent voices have called for intervention notwithstanding its illegality.  That cannot 
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on the use of force, taking into account ultimately unconvincing 
arguments offered by a number of commentators and officials that 
international law does, in fact, permit intervention. 
B.  Parsing the Prohibition 
Notwithstanding minority views to the contrary,72 the Charter of 
the United Nations (“the Charter”) prohibits the unauthorized use of 
force, even to stop mass atrocities.73  The Charter is generally 
recognized as a watershed in humanity’s political development and as 
the cornerstone of the international order established after World 
                                                        
be the solution, however, unless those same voices are content to participate in the erosion 
of the prohibition on the use of force and the rule of international law.  See John Irish, 
France Says Would Be Hard to Bypass U.N. In Action Against Syria, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-syria-crisis-france-
idUSBRE97P04B20130826; see also David Bosco, Military Action in Syria as Reprisal, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Aug. 25, 2013), 
http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/25/military_action_in_syria_as_reprisal#
sthash.ktyyxqXf.fRUuB1h5.dpbs (“But in a broader sense, Western governments would be 
violating international law in order to defend it. More specifically, they would be skirting 
the rules on when you can use force in order to defend a key norm of how parties may 
fight: the ban on the use of chemical weapons.”); Michael Ignatieff, How to Save the Syrians, 
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS BLOG (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/sep/13/how-save-syrians (“When legality 
and legitimacy part company, as they have done in Syria, those who say strict legality must 
prevail have an obligation to explain how this squares with morality, just as those say [sic] 
that morality should prevail need to explain why they are justified in breaking the law.”); 
Ian Hurd, Op-Ed., Bomb Syria, Even If It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_r=0 
(advocating for “constructive noncompliance” which means recognizing that international 
law is changing rather than advocating intervention on the basis of “legitimate but 
illegal”); Rebecca Lowe, Syria: Military Intervention Is Illegal—But May Be Legitimate, INT’L 
BAR ASS’N (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=26cfd2b2-e6cf-4209-903c-
9327c76c9bd4 (showing that Former French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs 
Bernard Kouchner believes that “legitimacy is often more important than legality” while 
Current French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius believes that nations cannot completely 
disregard international law). 
 72.  See ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT (1987); 
FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 
24–25 (1988). 
 73.  For a recent defense of this reading by Yale Law professors Oona Hathaway and 
Scott Shapiro, see Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-un-
vote-isnt-optional.html?_R=0.  See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 2013); Christine Gray, The International Court of Justice and the 
Use of Force, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE (Christian J. Tams and James Sloan ed., 2013). 
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War II.74  In Article 2, Paragraph 4, the Charter prohibits the use of 
force among states.75  The Charter provides just two exceptions to this 
blanket prohibition.  One is the right to self-defense, articulated in 
Article 51.76  The second is when the use of force is authorized by the 
Security Council using what are commonly referred to as “Chapter 
VII powers,” granted to it under Article 3977 and Article 42.78  As a 
preliminary matter, the legality of any proposed military action by the 
United States against Syria (or any future unauthorized military 
intervention) should first be tested against the language of the 
Charter.79 
The prohibition on the use of force has reached the level of 
customary international law.80  That view has been consistently upheld 
by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).81  In Corfu Channel,82 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,83 Armed 
                                                        
 74.  RAMESH THAKUR, NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW PERSPECTIVES: THE UNITED NATIONS, 
SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE 1–2 (2000). 
 75.  U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”). 
 76.  Id. at art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.  Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”). 
 77.  Id. at art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”). 
 78.  Id. at art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.  Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”). 
 79.  This interpretation of the language of the Charter is not uncontested.  Differing 
interpretations will be addressed below.  See infra notes 97–110 and accompanying text.   
 80.  See Gray, supra note 73.  
 81.  ICJ opinions, however, do not establish precedent and are only authoritative and 
binding with respect to the specific dispute between the parties to a case.  See infra notes 
101–111 and accompanying text. 
 82.  Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9). 
 83.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 100, 118–19 (June 27). 
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Activities on the Territory of the Congo,84 Legality of the Use of Force,85 and, to 
a lesser extent, the advisory opinions Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons86 
and Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,87 the ICJ 
has established that the Article 2(4) prohibition is broad, does not 
admit exceptions other than those listed in the Charter, and is a rule 
of customary international law.88  The General Assembly has also 
weighed in, with several resolutions intended to clarify and reinforce 
the Charter’s ban on the use of force.89  Many commentators even 
argue that it is a jus cogens norm.90 
The Charter does not provide a legal justification for military 
intervention in Syria—or anywhere else—unless in self-defense or 
with authorization from the Security Council.91  Some commentators, 
                                                        
 84.  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, 223–24 (Dec. 19). 
 85.  Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 124 (June 2); Legality of Use 
of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. 259 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.), 
1999 I.C.J. 363 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Ger.), 1999 I.C.J. 422 (June 2); 
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. It.), 1999 I.C.J. 481 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force 
(Yugo. v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. 542 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Port.), 1999 
I.C.J. 656 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 761 (June 2); 
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. 826 (June 2). 
 86.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 266 (July 8). 
 87.  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 171 (July 9). 
 88.  See infra Part II.C.   
 89.  See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/8018, at 122–23 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also G.A. Res. 66/253, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. 
No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253, at 1 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
 90.  JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (2d ed. 
2006); LINDSAY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE RESORT TO FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUS AD 
BELLUM AND THE WAR ON TERROR 9 (2010); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of 
Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1999); Pamela J. Stephens, A Categorical 
Approach to Human Rights Claims: Jus Cogens as a Limitation on Enforcement?, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
245, 253–54 (2004).  But see James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the 
Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215 (2011).  It is worth noting in the 
present context that the U.S. government itself referred to the prohibition as a jus cogens 
norm in its submission to the ICJ in the Nicaragua case.  Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).  This Article need not 
take a position on the issue, since the same argument applies whether the norm is 
conventional, customary, or jus cogens.   
 91.  See John D. Becker, The Continuing Relevance of Article 2(4): A Consideration of the 
Status of the U.N. Charter’s Limitations on the Use of Force, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 583, 591 
(2004); Sarah Mazzochi, Humanitarian Intervention in A Post-Iraq, Post-Darfur World: Is There 
Now A Duty to Prevent Genocide Even Without Security Council Approval?, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 111, 123–24 (2011); Paul Campos, Striking Syria Is Completely Illegal, TIME (Sept. 5, 
2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/09/05/obamas-plan-for-intervention-in-syria-is-
illegal/; Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 73; Kevin Jon Heller, Four Thoughts on Koh’s 
Defense of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 2, 2013), 
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however, disagree with the standard reading and instead propose 
either that Article 2(4), on its face, would permit the United States to 
attack Syria, or that subsequent developments in customary 
international law have created new legal exceptions to the rule.92  
Supporters seeking to ground military intervention in international 
law must therefore offer an affirmative case.  Some standard 
arguments in that vein will be examined in the following paragraphs. 
Arguments that Article 2(4), on its face, in fact permits 
unauthorized military interventions differ slightly from one another, 
but all flow from a misreading of the text, a disregard of drafting 
history of the provision, and an inequitable weighting of subsequent 
state practice. 
The argument that the language of 2(4) permits some uses of 
force rests on two key ambiguities in the text.  First, is the operation 
of “against the territorial integrity or political independence.”93  
Second, is the phrase “or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”94  In Article 2(4) the ‘active’ phrase 
“Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force” is immediately followed by “against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state.”95  But 2(4) does not 
                                                        
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/02/four-thoughts-kohs-defense-unilateral-humanitarian-
intervention/; David Kaye, Harold Koh’s Case for Humanitarian Intervention, JUST SEC. (Oct. 
7, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/07/kaye-kohs-case/; Carsten Stahn, Guest Post: 
On ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, ‘Lawmaking’ Moments and What the ‘Law Ought to Be’—
Counseling Caution Against a New ‘Affirmative Defense to Art. 2 (4)’ After Syria, OPINIO JURIS 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/08/guest-post-humanitarian-intervention-
lawmaking-moments-law-counseling-caution-new-affirmative-de/. 
 92.  Most recently, Professor Koh advanced one such reading. Harold Hongju Koh, 
Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way 
Forward), JUST SEC. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/; see also 
TESÓN, supra note 72; Jordan Paust, US Use of Limited Force in Syria Can be Lawful Under the 
UN Charter, JURIST (Sept. 10, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/09/jordan-paust-force-
syria.php; Jennifer Trahan, Syria Insta-Symposium: Jennifer Trahan—The Legality of a U.S. 
Strike on Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 31, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/31/syria-
insta-symposium-jennifer-trahan-legality-u-s-strike-syria/.  Tesón, at least, has 
acknowledged that his view is not widely shared.  See Fernando Tesón, Syria and the Doctrine 
of Humanitarian Intervention, BLEEDING HEART LIBERTARIANS (Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2013/09/syria-and-the-doctrine-of-humanitarian-
intervention/ (“Most international lawyers require United Nations Security Council 
authorization as a condition for the lawfulness of action (not Congressional authorization, 
which is irrelevant to international law.)  I disagree, but mine is concededly a minority 
view among international law scholars.”). 
 93.  U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4. 
 94.  Id.  The following discussion is adapted from the thorough treatment of this strain 
of scholarship provided by Simon Chesterman.  See CHESTERMAN, supra note 14. 
 95.  U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4. 
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specify whether or how the latter modifies the former.96  Is it a non-
exclusive list of types of force that, among all other types, are 
prohibited?  Or is it a restriction of the scope of the prohibition, 
limiting it only to the use of force against either territorial integrity or 
political independence?  Both options require reading additional 
words into the text.  The former would read something like “All 
Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force . . . including, but 
not restricted to, the use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” (“Option A”).  The latter would be 
something to the effect that “All Members shall refrain from the 
threat or use of force . . . where such force is used against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state” (“Option B”).  
Option B might permit humanitarian intervention as long as the 
intention of the intervener is not to alter the boundary or change the 
regime of the state it is attacking.97 
The second ambiguity, the effect of “or in any other 
manner . . . ,” is interpreted by proponents of a permissive standard as 
both reinforcing the choice of Option B over Option A and providing 
a criterion for uses of force endorsed by the Charter without 
authorization and outside the enumerated exceptions of Article 51 
and Chapter VII.  In the former regard “or” completes the exclusive 
series—as in, “shall not do X, Y, or Z” such that X, Y, and Z constitute 
the entire universe of things prohibited.98  In the latter regard, the 
“other” in “in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations” would characterize the entire list—and therefore the 
entire Article—as prohibiting only inconsistent uses of force and 
                                                        
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See generally TESÓN, supra note 72.  Under this reading, a state could send tanks 
and infantry across a border and—as long as the invading state did not intend to change 
the boundary—that would not constitute a violation of the invaded state’s territorial 
integrity.  Or a state could shoot down the fighter planes of another state’s military—
fighter planes presumably carrying out the wishes of that state’s commander in chief—
without infringing on that state’s political independence.  But see Oscar Schachter, 
Editorial Comments, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 649 
(1984) (“The idea that wars waged in a good cause such as democracy and human rights 
would not involve a violation of territorial integrity or political independence demands an 
Orwellian construction of those terms.  It is no wonder that the argument has not found 
any significant support.”). 
 98.  Paust, supra note 92 (“First, not every use of armed force is prohibited in the text 
of Article 2(4) of the Charter, which expressly covers only three types of force: (1) that 
used ‘against’ the ‘territorial integrity’ of a ‘state,’ (2) that used ‘against’ the ‘political 
independence’ of a ‘state,’ and (3) that which is ‘in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations.’”); see also Jordan J. Paust, Relative Sovereignty and 
Permissible Use of Armed Force, 20 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. INT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); Jordan 
Paust, Remembering Tom Franck, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 409, 410 (2010). 
  
338 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:315 
therefore, by implication, permitting consistent uses such as the 
protection of the human rights of endangered civilians.99 
While readings of “other” in this vein are frequently offered 
alone, they are in fact dependent on choosing Option B over Option 
A.  If territorial integrity and political independence are understood 
in the first place to be examples in a non-exhaustive list (Option A), 
then it becomes very difficult to read “other inconsistent purposes” as 
anything other than a third item in that (still) non-exhaustive list.  It 
is only choosing to characterize the list as exhaustive that opens the 
question of what is permitted and thereby makes it possible to suggest 
that states may use force in ways that are consistent with the purposes 
of the Charter. 
None of the foregoing readings survive close examination.  
Certainly the text of 2(4) is ambiguous, and if that were the end of 
the analysis then the international community would be left with 
competing plausible interpretations and no way outside of 
authoritative determination—as by a court—to decide between them.  
Fortunately, international law provides guidance on dispelling that 
ambiguity.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
that, where the definitive meaning cannot be gleaned from the text, 
recourse may be had to the drafting history and subsequent 
practice.100  Furthermore, Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, which is commonly understood to be 
an authoritative statement of the sources of international law, 
provides that judicial decisions are a subsidiary means of determining 
the law.101  Both the drafting history of Article 2(4) and the judicial 
decisions of the ICJ on the use of force point unequivocally to Option 
A, the reading of 2(4) as an expansive prohibition of all uses of force 
save acts a) in self-defense; or, b) authorized by the Security 
                                                        
 99.  See Koh, supra note 92 (suggesting that “under certain highly constrained 
circumstances a nation could lawfully use or threaten force for genuinely humanitarian 
purposes”); TESÓN, LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 72. 
 100.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 3, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”). 
 101.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“1. The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply: . . . d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.”). 
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Council.102  The following paragraphs will discuss the drafting history 
of Article 2(4), and its interpretation in several judgments of the ICJ. 
The subsequent practice of states will be addressed in subsection II.C 
since it overlaps significantly with the question of whether a new rule 
of customary international law has come into existence following the 
adoption of the Charter. 
The text originally proposed at Dumbarton Oaks in 1945 did not 
contain the problematic phrases.103  To the contrary, it simply read, 
“All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the Organization.”104  The addition of the 
“territorial integrity or political independence” language was the 
result of an Australian amendment intended to give peace of mind to 
smaller states by emphasizing the protection of their territorial 
boundaries and political independence.105 These smaller states were 
seeking to further emphasize the limitations on the power of larger 
states to use force.  The language was therefore intended to 
emphasize rather than to limit the broad prohibition.  For instance, 
the Norwegian delegation—which was in favor of omitting the 
reference—noted that “it should be made very clear in the Report to 
the Commission that this paragraph 4 did not contemplate any use of 
force . . . going beyond individual or collective self-defense.”106  The 
U.S. delegation stated “that the intention of the authors of the 
original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute all-
inclusive prohibition; the phrase ‘or in any other manner’ was 
designed to insure that there should be no loopholes.”107  
Accordingly, one must either completely ignore or reinterpret the 
                                                        
 102.  As Secretary of State Kerry himself affirmed at his confirmation hearing when he 
said, “I think a U.N. resolution is a necessary ingredient to provide the legal basis for 
military action in an emergency.”  Hearing on the Nomination of Massachusetts Democratic Sen. 
John Kerry to Be Secretary of State: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong. 
(2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Kerry-
Confirmation-Testimony.pdf. 
 103.  CHESTERMAN, supra note 14, at 49. 
 104.  Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization, 
Washington, D.C., Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization (Oct. 
7, 1944), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1944/441007a.html. 
 105.  United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 
Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted on Behalf of Australia, 3 Doc. U.N. 
Conf. on Int’l Org. 543 (May 5, 1945); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE 
OF FORCE BY STATES 267 (1963). 
 106.  United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 
Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1, 6 Doc. U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 334–35 
(June 5, 1945).  
 107.  Id. at 335. 
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drafting history of the Charter to arrive at a reading under which only 
three restricted types of force are prohibited. 
The prohibition on the use of force by states has been the subject 
of several opinions issued by the ICJ, each of which emphasized the 
broad nature of the norm.108  In the present context the opinion in 
the Corfu Channel case is particularly relevant. There, the Court noted 
that the prohibition on the use of force was not subject to 
amendment by the later devised interventionist theories of states.109  
In a passage that has been often quoted by both scholars and the 
Court itself, the majority noted that 
[t]he Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention 
as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the 
past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, 
whatever be the present defects in international 
organization, find a place in international law.  Intervention 
is perhaps still less inadmissible in the particular form it 
would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be 
reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead 
to perverting the administration of international justice 
itself.110 
One aspect of the reasoning stands out here.  The Court squarely 
engaged the question of what happens when international 
institutional arrangements fail to serve their intended purpose.  
Today observers would point to the paralysis of the Security Council 
even in the face of horrific, large-scale violations of rights as just such 
a defect. The Court, however, was concerned that the outcome of 
allowing states the freedom to intervene in the face of organizational 
                                                        
 108.  It should be noted that there is no stare decisis in international law and that, 
formally, decisions of the ICJ are only binding with respect to the parties.  They do not 
provide precedent or establish authoritative determinations of international law.  
Decisions of Courts, including the ICJ, are, according to the ICJ’s own statute, a subsidiary 
means of establishing international law.  In practice, however, decisions of the ICJ are 
given considerable weight by tribunals the world over, and by the ICJ itself in future 
matters.  See generally Nathan Miller, An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of 
“Precedent” Across International Tribunals, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 483 (2002); Christopher 
Greenwood, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Global Community, 17 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 233 (2011). 
 109.  Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34–35 (Apr. 9).  In so doing, the Court 
expressly rejected the position of the United Kingdom (still advanced by some scholars) 
that force that fell short of threatening the territorial integrity or political independence 
of the target state did not run afoul of the Article 2(4) prohibition.  See generally 
Christopher Greenwood, The International Court of Justice and the Use of Force, in FIFTY YEARS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 373 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
eds., 1996). 
 110.  Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 35. 
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deadlock would be a return to the “policy of force” that characterized 
the pre-United Nations era. 
The ICJ quoted the language from Corfu Channel in its Nicaragua 
decision.  There, far from limiting the prohibition on the use of 
force, the Court arguably amplified it by determining that even 
providing arms to groups using force against a sovereign constituted 
the use of force against that state—even if the armed forces of the 
supplying state never fired a single shot.111 Some of the Court’s 
reasoning in the Nicaragua case is especially relevant to the question 
of whether subsequent developments in customary international law 
have superseded the broad prohibition in the Charter.  These will be 
discussed in greater detail below.112 
Some would argue that state practice has shifted considerably 
since the end of the Cold War, weakening the relevance of Cold War-
era decisions.  Yet in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, which was 
filed in 2008, the Court had ample opportunity to consider 
contemporary state practice and its potential impact on the nature of 
customary law regarding the use of force.  The Court in that case 
again emphasized the customary nature of the prohibition on the use 
of force and again put forward its reading of Article 2(4) as an 
expansive prohibition.113 
The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case did, 
however, leave open the possibility that future developments in 
customary international law could supersede the prohibition on the 
use of force found in the Charter.  The Court noted that: 
The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct 
prima facie inconsistent with the principle of non-
intervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as 
justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an 
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared 
in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of 
customary international law.114 
                                                        
 111.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 15 (June 27). 
 112.  See infra Part II.C. 
 113.  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19) (noting that “[t]he prohibition against the use of force is a 
cornerstone of the United Nations Charter,” and that the Charter does not allow use of 
force outside the strict confines of art. 51 in self-defense). 
 114.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 207.  
The Court went on to note that no such shared principle was evident:  
In fact however the Court finds that States have not justified their conduct by 
reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its 
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One could argue, based on that language, that the behavior of 
powerful states could be sufficient to satisfy the first criterion (a 
general practice) for a new rule of customary international law. 
However, the Court noted that acts of intervention would not be the 
only behavior relevant to the analysis.115  Also important would be the 
reaction of states to such military interventions.  Would they be 
accepted? Or condemned?  The following section will show that states 
have developed no new general practice or opinio juris.  Customary 
international law on the use of force remains unmodified, and the 
Charter’s prohibition unaltered. 
C.  Countervailing Custom? 
A customary international legal rule permitting unauthorized 
intervention could, based on the later-in-time principle, modify the 
Charter prohibition, but no such rule has come into being.  The 
practice of the small minority of states that have engaged in 
unauthorized military intervention cannot be sufficient to establish 
the general practice required for the emergence of a new rule of 
customary international law.  Even if it could, the total absence of an 
express belief among those states that their interventions were in fact 
permitted under international law significantly undermines any claim 
to the emergence of a new rule superseding the Charter prohibition 
on the use of force.  In contrast, the vast majority of states in the 
world have clearly and consistently articulated their opinion that 
military intervention absent Security Council authorization remains 
illegal under international law. 
The inconsistent, at best, opinio juris (see below) of 
interventionist states must be understood in the context of the strong, 
clear, and often-expressed opinion of the majority of states that such 
conduct remains entirely prohibited by international law.  In 1970, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution which has come to be 
                                                        
prohibition.  The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated 
their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons 
connected with, for example, the domestic policies of that country, its ideology, 
the level of its armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy.  But these were 
statements of international policy, and not an assertion of rules of existing 
international law.   
Id. 
 115.  Id. (“Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, 
must have behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’” (quoting North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 44, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20))).  
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known as Friendly Relations.  That resolution, passed unanimously, 
declares: 
 No State or group of States has the right to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State.  Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic and cultural elements are in 
violation of international law.116 
Another important General Assembly resolution is the Definition 
of Aggression.  Adopted in 1974, the resolution endorses a definition of 
aggression which specifies that “[t]he invasion or attack by the armed 
forces of a State of the territory of another State . . . however 
temporary” shall be considered an act of war.117  It further provides 
that “[n]o consideration of whatever nature, whether political, 
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for 
aggression.”118 
More recently, in the aftermath of the NATO operation in 
Kosovo, more than 130 states (approximately two thirds of all states in 
the world) issued a declaration specifically denouncing the legality of 
humanitarian intervention absent Security Council authorization: 
 We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between 
humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United 
Nations.  We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian 
intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations 
Charter or in the general principles of international 
law. . . .  Furthermore, we stress that humanitarian assistance 
should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence of host 
countries, and should be initiated in response to a request 
or with the approval of these States.119 
                                                        
 116.  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 123 (Oct. 
24, 1970) [hereinafter The Resolution].  
 117.  Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. 
No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9890, at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Group of 77 South Summit, Declaration of the South Summit, GROUP OF 77 (Apr. 10–
14, 2000), http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm; see also Heller, 
supra note 91 (discussing the Declaration of the South Summit).  
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Yet many scholars contend that, since the adoption of the 
Charter, a new rule of customary international law has come into 
being. This new rule of customary international law supersedes the 
prohibition on the use of force found in the Charter and permits 
military interventionism.120  It is well settled under international law 
that proving the existence of a rule of customary international law 
requires showing a general practice of states and a belief by the states 
that the practice is required by law (opinio juris).121  Both elements 
must be satisfied; the absence of either a general practice or of a 
belief that the general practice is required by law would seriously 
hinder any effort to establish the existence of a new rule of customary 
international law.122 
The Vienna Convention provides that textual ambiguities may be 
cured with reference to subsequent practice as well as to the drafting 
history of the treaty in question.  An examination of the subsequent 
practice related to Article 2(4) will therefore serve both to cement the 
broad reading of the prohibition on the use of force and to establish 
that the text of the Charter has not been supplanted by subsequent 
developments in customary international law. 
The contention that a general practice has emerged since the 
adoption of the charter relies on the interventionist track record of a 
small handful of states.  To paraphrase the famous aphorism of the 
late Louis Henkin, most states mostly adhere to the prohibition on 
the use of force most of the time.123  The vast majority of 
unauthorized military interventions undertaken since the 
establishment of the United Nations were conducted by the United 
States and a handful of Western European states.  Altogether, these 
interventionist states account for, at most, ten percent of the states in 
the world.  To argue that the behavior of those states gives rise to the 
“general practice” required for the establishment of a new rule of 
customary international law is to argue that the behavior of the most 
                                                        
 120.  See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: 
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 2 (2001); see generally Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The 
Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under 
the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203 (1974).  
 121.  ICJ Statute, supra note 101, 59 Stat. at 1060 (stating that the Court shall apply 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); see also JAMES 
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–30 (7th ed. 2008). 
 122.  JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th 
ed. 2013). 
 123.  See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 
1979) (“It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”). 
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powerful states in the world counts for more, much more, in the 
development of customary international law then the behavior of the 
entire rest of the world.124  Such an argument violates the principle of 
sovereign equality and comes perilously close to substituting power 
for the rule of law. 
Even if one were to accept a theory of customary international 
law under which the behavior of a small, but powerful, minority of 
states was sufficient to establish a general practice, it would be almost 
impossible to argue for the existence of opinio juris when even 
interventionist states go out of their way to avoid declaring that their 
interventions are in accordance with a new rule of international law.  
The NATO operation in Kosovo is frequently cited by proponents of 
an international law permitting intervention.125  However, the 
position of the United States was made clear by Acting Senior Legal 
Adviser to the U.S. State Department Michael Matheson.  Speaking 
on a panel at the meetings of the American Society of International 
Law in 1999, Matheson said: 
[M]any NATO states—including the United States—had not 
accepted the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as an 
independent legal basis for military action that was not 
justified by self-defense or the authorization of the Security 
Council.   
                                                        
 124.  Several scholars do advance such an understanding of the development of 
customary international law, one that explicitly privileges the practice of a small group of 
elite states.  See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 115, 146 (2005) (“Opinio juris refers to the beliefs of states that interact with a 
potential violator.  To the extent that these states believe there exists a legal obligation, 
the potential violator faces a rule of [Customary International Law].”); Brigitte Stern, 
Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 89, 108 (2001) (“[T]he 
customary international rule is the one which is considered to be such by the will of those 
states which are able to impose their point of view.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 125.  See, e.g., Keith A. Petty, Humanity and National Security: The Law of Mass Atrocity 
Response Operations, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 745, 799 (2013) (“Although contingent sovereignty 
does not expressly authorize unilateral intervention to oust a sitting government, the 
foundation is in place to justify such an action, not unlike the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999.”); Ashley Deeks, Syria, Chemical Weapons, and Possible U.S. Military Action, 
LAWFARE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/syria-chemical-weapons-
and-possible-u-s-military-action/#.UvpqW3k3-d8; Frances Gibb, Analysis: Kosovo a Legal 
Precedent for Strike on Syria, THE TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article3853582.ece; Enver Hoxhaj, It’s 1999 in Syria, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/23/it_s_1999_in_syria_kosovo_foreign_
minister_intervention; Mark Landler & Michael R. Gordon, Air War in Kosovo Seen as 
Precedent in Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-in-
possible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?pagewanted=all. 
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  . . . . 
 This was a pragmatic justification designed to provide a 
basis for moving forward without establishing new doctrines 
or precedents that might trouble individual NATO members 
or later haunt the Alliance if misused by others.126 
Furthermore, of the states participating in the military campaign only 
two have ever clearly stated their position that the intervention was 
permitted under international law.  The bombing of Kosovo gave rise 
to proceedings in the ICJ.  Only Belgium and the United Kingdom 
argued that their actions were in conformity with international law.127  
The rest, including the United States, declined to do so.  Of all the 
states in the world, only the United Kingdom has clearly and openly 
articulated its view that international law permits military intervention 
without Security Council authorization under certain 
circumstances.128 
Furthermore, interventionist states have harshly condemned the 
same conduct when undertaken by others.  In the conflict between 
Russia and Georgia in 2008, for instance, Russia claimed to be acting 
to protect the non-Georgian (Russian) minorities in South Ossetia 
                                                        
 126.  Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 301, 301 (2000). 
 127.  CHESTERMAN, supra note 14, at 46 (“In the joint hearings on the ten requests for 
provisional measures, only Belgium presented a clear argument that its actions were 
justified on the basis of a right of humanitarian intervention.”). 
 128.  The Prime Minister’s Office of the United Kingdom published the following legal 
opinion that sets out the U.K. Government’s position regarding the legality of military 
action in Syria:  
If action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted 
under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the 
scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and 
disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a 
legal basis is available, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, 
provided three conditions are met: 
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international 
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, 
requiring immediate and urgent relief; 
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use 
of force if lives are to be saved; and 
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim 
of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to 
this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other 
purpose).   
U.K. GOV’T, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE BY SYRIAN REGIME: U.K. GOVERNMENT LEGAL 
POSITION (Aug. 29, 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-
government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-
position-html-version. 
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and Abkhazia from ethnic cleansing being undertaken by the 
Georgian government.129  Georgia took the first shots.  The Georgian 
government had a long history of violent, racist rhetoric against non-
Georgian minorities, and the actual effect of the conflict was that 
nearly half the minority population fled to Russia.  Russia even went 
to the Security Council, where it claimed that it had taken military 
action in part to protect civilians, claims that were met with 
skepticism.130 
Many governments rejected Russia’s claims to legality.131  The 
United States in particular was outraged, and strenuously defended 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.132  It may very well 
be that Russia acted in bad faith and that its claims to a humanitarian 
justification for its military conduct were a smokescreen.  This Article 
does not take a position on that question, nor does it need to.  The 
relevance in the present context is that the condemnations issued by 
the United States and other interventionist governments were not 
framed as disagreements over whether the particular criteria that 
characterize a customary international rule favoring intervention were 
or were not met—as might have been expected if those countries 
believed that such a law existed.  Rather, the objections were couched 
in the stark language of the Charter, the prohibition on the use of 
force, and the fundamental principle of sovereign equality. 
It should be clear from the discussion above that states 
undertaking unauthorized military intervention have done so with an 
almost deliberate lack of accompanying opinio juris.  Hence it seems 
difficult to argue that there has been any modification of the broad 
customary international legal prohibition on the use of force that has 
been noted and upheld time and again by the ICJ.  The question then 
                                                        
 129.  Nicolai N. Petro, The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia, 32 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1524, 1545 (2009). 
 130.  See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds Third Emergency 
Meeting as South Ossetia Conflict Intensifies, Expands to Other Parts of Georgia, U.N. 
Press Release SC/9419 (Aug. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9419.doc.htm/ (“The Russian Federation 
wondered whether the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ could be used to describe Georgia’s 
actions.  How many civilians had to die before it was described as genocide?”). 
 131.  Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 73. 
 132.  See Remarks With French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the Situation in Georgia, DEP’T ST. 
ARCHIVE (Aug. 14, 2008), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108254.htm.  As Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice stated, “Too many innocent people have died and Georgia, whose territorial integrity 
and independence and sovereignty we fully respect, must be able to get back to normal 
life,” reasserting, “that the United States of America stands strongly, and the President of 
France has just said, for the territorial integrity of Georgia.  This is a member-state of the 
United Nations whose internationally recognized boundaries have to be respected.”  Id. 
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arises whether, in the absence a new rule of customary international 
law, some other basis in international law might be found.  The 
Obama administration has suggested that the Assad regime’s use of 
chemical weapons might provide such a basis. 
D.  Resurrecting Reprisals 
On September 10, 2013, President Barack Obama firmly 
distanced himself from the few fragile threads his administration 
might have used to fashion a justification under international law for 
military intervention in Syria by advancing a legal theory apparently 
based on the antiquated doctrine of reprisals.  In his speech to the 
American people that night, President Obama narrowly and 
specifically advanced the use of chemical weapons by the Assad 
regime as the reason for intervention, noting, “On that terrible night, 
the world saw in gruesome detail the terrible nature of chemical 
weapons, and why the overwhelming majority of humanity has 
declared them off-limits—a crime against humanity, and a violation of 
the laws of war.”133  He argued: 
[I]t is in the national security interests of the United States 
to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons 
through a targeted military strike. The purpose of this strike 
would be to deter Assad from using chemical weapons, to 
degrade his regime’s ability to use them, and to make clear 
to the world that we will not tolerate their use.134 
By basing both the justification for intervention and its goals in terms 
of chemical weapons, President Obama moved away from a theory of 
                                                        
 133.  Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Address 
to the Nation on Syria (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria. 
 134.  Id.  The portion of his speech quoted above could be read as an entirely political 
(or military) justification of intervention—one that ignored international law altogether.  
However, in the past President Obama explicitly acknowledged that his decisions would be 
driven, at least in part, by international law.  And he relied heavily on the illegality of 
chemical weapons under international law in other parts of his speech:  
Because these weapons can kill on a mass scale, with no distinction between 
soldier and infant, the civilized world has spent a century working to ban them.  
And in 1997, the United States Senate overwhelmingly approved an 
international agreement prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, now joined by 
189 governments that represent 98 percent of humanity.   
Id.   
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humanitarian intervention.  Instead, it seemed that he was attempting 
to resurrect the doctrine of reprisals.135 
Under pre-Charter international law, one way in which states 
could lawfully use force against one another was to exercise their 
right of armed reprisal in response to a violation of international law: 
Reprisals in particular are a traditional act of self-help under 
international law, consisting of a breach of international law 
in response to a prior violation by another state and 
undertaken for the purpose of enforcing compliance.  They 
are “unlawful acts that become lawful in that they constitute 
a reaction to a delinquency by another State.”136 
The enforcement aspect of that definition lends further support to 
the contention that President Obama was advancing a theory based 
on the doctrine of reprisals.  Armed reprisals were understood to be a 
form of law enforcement, a way for a state to exercise self-help in 
response to a violation of its rights.137  As the Institut de droit 
international put it in 1934: “Reprisals are measures of coercion, 
derogating from the ordinary rules of international law, decided and 
taken by a State, in response to wrongful acts committed against it, by 
                                                        
 135.  Shane Darcy, Retaliation and Reprisal, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller ed., forthcoming 2015).  Nor is President 
Obama alone in that regard.  Justice Goldstone believes:  
In the present case, it could be argued that the military force is being used to 
protect the people of Syria from the future use of chemical weapons.  That 
would very much depend on the efficacy of the force used and whether it would 
indeed deter such future use of such weapons. 
   . . . If the intervention is calculated to prevent the future use of chemical 
weapons by the Syrian Government and any future regimes that might consider 
it, I would support such an intervention.   
Lowe, supra note 71. 
 136.  Darcy, supra note 135 (manuscript at 1) (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2005)). 
 137.  Id.  This Article takes the position that armed reprisals have been outlawed by the 
Charter.  See infra notes 142–148 and accompanying text.  Hence a detailed discussion of 
the nuances of that doctrine is beyond the scope of the present project.  It is worth noting, 
however, that for a state to acquire a right of armed reprisal the target state must first have 
a) violated international law and, b) in so doing, injured the interests of the state 
undertaking the reprisal.  “Reprisals are acts which, although normally illegal, are 
exceptionally permitted as reaction of one state against a violation of its right by another 
state.”  HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (7th ed. 2007).  The question 
of which rights of the U.S. Syria might have violated and the extent of the armed reprisals 
authorized by that violation would require quite a bit of unpacking.  One possible answer 
would be legal obligations erga omnes (owed to the entire international community) 
created by the ban on chemical weapons.  See ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA 
OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1996). 
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another State, and intended to impose on it, by pressure exerted 
through injury, the return to legality.”138 
President Obama’s remarks did seem to emphasize the “law 
enforcement” aspect of the intended intervention; he noted that 
military action would specifically target the Assad regime’s ability to 
use chemical weapons and deter future use.139 
To be sure, the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical 
weapons are illegal.140  This is true both under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to which Syria was not, at the time, a party and under 
customary international law.141  Syria is bound by the latter, customary 
international law, even if it has not ratified the former.  It therefore 
seems clear that Syria has violated its international legal obligations 
several times over—in the production, the storage, and, finally, the 
use of prohibited weapons. 
But even with that being the case, international law simply has no 
provision that allows for the use of force by one state, or even a group 
of states, against another that has violated international law.  That was 
not always true.  Before the Charter and the advent of the modern era 
of international law, states commonly used force against one another 
as a way to vindicate their rights under international law.142  The 
Charter, however, represented a paradigm shift away from force and 
punishment as the dominant modes of international relations and 
towards a system defined by diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes.143  To argue that the Charter permits armed 
reprisals is to argue in favor of Option B described above, or the 
position that the Charter sets out only a weak and limited prohibition 
                                                        
 138.  Darcy, supra note 135 (manuscript at 4) (quoting Institut de Droit International, 
Session de Paris 1934, Régime de répresaillies en temps de paix, Article 1). 
 139.  Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 133.   
 140.  Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–2014, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Aug. 
19, 2014), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-
Weapons-Activity.  On September 12, 2013, Syria: 
[S]ent a letter to the United Nations Secretary General which said that Assad 
signed a legislative decree providing the accession of Syria to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. In the letter, Assad said Syria would observe its CWC 
obligations immediately, as opposed to 30 days from the date of accession, as 
stipulated in the treaty.  
Id. 
 141.  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]. 
 142.  Blum, supra note 12, at 58. 
 143.  Id. at 73.  Professor Blum documents the move from narratives of punishment to 
ones of regulation and cooperation, then goes on to argue that the shift obscured the 
persistence of the same forms of interstate relations.   
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of the use of certain kinds of force.144  However, for the many reasons 
outlined above, that reading is unsustainable.  Furthermore, the 
subsequent practice with regard to reprisals is very similar to the 
practice with regard to the general use of force.  Scholars,145 the 
ICJ,146 the General Assembly,147 and the International Law 
Commission148 have all indicated that armed reprisals have no basis in 
contemporary international law.  And there are even fewer examples 
of state practice characterized as reprisals than there are of attacks 
with other claimed justifications.149 
The preceding Sections show the dilemma posed by the 
professed commitment of the international community to use force in 
situations, like the Syrian civil war, where states torture and kill 
massive numbers of their own citizens, and the persistent illegality of 
such uses of force.  One way around that dilemma is to define it away. 
E.  More of a Guideline, Really 
The argument offered in this Article assumes that states prefer to 
act according to international law; that law, even international law, 
constrains behavior (in this case of states); that international law has 
entered a “post-ontological era” where its existence as “real” law need 
no longer be defended;150 that states and the international legal 
system derive reciprocal legitimacy from behavior by states in 
conformity with the law.151  Furthermore, this Article aligns itself with 
the strain of thinking that the United States harms its standing in the 
world and its ability to achieve its medium- and long-term interests 
                                                        
 144.  Supra Part II.A. 
 145.  JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 415 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 
1963); CRAWFORD, supra note 121, at 466; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, in 2 THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 58 (1968); Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual 
Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 
505, 514 (Antonio Cassese ed. 1986); Darcy, supra note 135. 
 146.  Darcy, supra note 135 (manuscript at 16). 
 147.  Id. (manuscript at 14–15). 
 148.  Id. (manuscript at 17–18). 
 149.  Id. (manuscript at 20) (“There are a few isolated examples, but nothing 
approaching a widespread practice, and states invariably justify unilateral actions under 
self-defence, rather than reprisals.”). 
 150.  THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 (1995) 
(“With new opportunities come new challenges!  The questions to which the international 
lawyer must now be prepared to respond, in this post-ontological era, are different from 
the traditional inquiry: whether international law is law.  Instead, we are now asked: is 
international law effective?  Is it enforceable?  Is it understood?  And, the most important 
question: Is international law fair?”). 
 151.  THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).   
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when it distances itself from multilateral institutional arrangements in 
pursuit of short-term goals.152 
Some scholars, and perhaps many officials in the governments of 
strong states, would view such assumptions as misguided.  They would 
characterize over-reliance on the language of the Charter, the equal 
reliance on opinio juris and state practice, and the insistence on 
giving similar weight to the practices of states small and large as 
characteristic of international legal formalism derived from a 
vanished Westphalian world.153  Critics of formalism offer instead an 
instrumental conception of international law as an open system, one 
in which legal texts are the beginning but not necessarily the end of 
the conversation.154  On that account, power and international 
                                                        
 152.  MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT (Stewart 
Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002).  Kenneth Anderson notes the dependence of the 
success of extra-Charter policies like “illegal but legitimate” on the absence of opposition, 
on “a residual, hopeful belief left over from 1990 that the great powers . . . were in 
essential agreement on such things as mass atrocities.”  Kenneth Anderson, Legality of 
Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapon Attacks, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/21/legality-intervention-
syria-response-chemical-weapon-attacks.  He goes on to argue that the United States can 
no longer count on such acquiescence:  
In retrospect, it would probably be more accurate to say that Russia correctly 
perceived that it lacked the real power to contest Kosovo and simply let it go—
without, however, much forgiving or forgetting.  In today’s world of rising great 
powers, BRICS, resurgent China and Russia, the extra-legal political legitimacy 
that once made this argument plausible as an alternative to a formal legal one is 
not really evident. Should the United States or its allies act alone, they cannot 
depend on the same general sense of political legitimacy that NATO could in 
Kosovo as late as 1999.  
Id.   
 153.  For prominent defenses of this approach, see generally  MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010); Jutta Brunnée 
& Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: International Law After Iraq, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
785, 800 (2004) (“[H]umanitarian intervention may be maturing into an accepted legal 
justification for the use of force.”); Michael C. Wood, Towards New Circumstances in Which 
the Use of Force May Be Authorized? The Cases of Humanitarian Intervention, Counter-Terrorism, 
and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY 
AND REALITY—A NEED FOR CHANGE? 75, 82 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005) 
(“There are some who advocate a right of ‘humanitarian intervention’, others [including 
the United Kingdom] who refer rather to an exceptional right to use force to avert an 
‘overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe,’ and yet others who deny any such right.”).  
 154.  It is important not to draw this distinction too sharply.  Both camps would likely 
regard authorization by the Security Council as both the most desirable resolution and as 
dispositive of the question of legitimacy.  See Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: 
Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 (2013).  At least some 
members of both camps would likely agree that the humanitarian intervention in some 
situations would be desirable even absent Security Council Authorization. “One may like 
or dislike this state of affairs, but so it is under lex lata.”  Id. at 162 (quoting Antonio 
Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
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realpolitik are an integral part of the international “legal” 
conversation and serve to keep international law relevant in light of 
the changeable interests of powerful states.155 
For instrumentalists, the moral considerations sketched in Part 
II.A. amount to arguments of law in favor of intervention.  
Instrumentalists view intervention in Syria as potentially justified 
because the formal dictates of international law (those described in 
the foregoing sections) fail to accommodate the strong moral and/or 
policy imperatives of powerful international actors and of the 
international system itself.156  Certainly the conflict in Syria is a 
catastrophe.  As discussed above, concerns about the protection of 
individuals from war crimes, crimes against humanity, and massive 
human rights violations at the hands of the very sovereigns charged 
with their protection are, or have recently become, issues at the 
center of international law.157  The vast majority of states, however, 
                                                        
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25 (1999)).  
Where they would differ, crucially, is on the legal effect of their reasons for disliking the 
prohibition of intervention.   
 155.  See Anderson, supra note 152.  Anderson notes: 
  This approach to international law differs from the “illegal but legitimate” way 
of seeing international law, in that the pragmatic approach views these other 
factors as part of international law itself, and indeed a vital way of ensuring that 
international law remains relevant as law to the harsh realities of international 
politics.  It rejects formalism because it wraps these consequences-based, real 
world concerns into the law itself—and hence offers a view of the law that is still 
about law, but goes well beyond strict formalism.  
Id.  
 156.  Oxford University has prepared an excellent overview of academic writing on the 
topic of Syria.  Because of the fast pace of the debate, much of the conversation took place 
on blogs or on the online publishing platforms of major journals.  Debate Map: Use of Force 
Against Syria, OXFORD PUB. INT’L LAW, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force-against-syria 
(last updated Apr. 29, 2014).  Instrumentalist conceptions may be found in the arguments 
of many contributors.  Harold Koh offers one of the most powerful arguments in this 
regard.  See Koh, supra note 29, at 2 (“[Koh] agree[s] with former British Legal Advisor Sir 
Daniel Bethlehem that ‘[i]n the case of the law on humanitarian intervention, an analysis 
that simply relies on the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter, and its related principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, is . . . overly 
simplistic.’” (quoting Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment—The Legal Basis in Favour 
of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-
humanitarian-intervention/)).  
 157. See Koh, supra note 29, at 3 (“A ‘per se illegal’ rule would overlook many other 
pressing facts of great concern to international law that distinguish Syria from past cases: 
including the catastrophic humanitarian situation, the likelihood of future atrocities, the 
grievous nature of already-committed atrocities that amount to crimes against humanity 
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the documented deliberate and 
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would strongly disagree that the ascendance of concern for the 
individual has displaced concern for the sovereign.158 
One way in which such theories operate is to conflate moral or 
policy considerations with the law and to resolve any apparent conflict 
in favor of those considerations even when such a resolution requires 
unsupportable readings of the law.159  Such theories do not help to 
resolve the tension between the competing moral imperatives of 
intervening to stop atrocities and upholding the rule of law because 
they hold that the rule of law conforms itself to the moral and policy 
imperatives of states—or at least certain states.  This Article is not the 
place to hash out, once again, the ongoing debate between 
competing conceptions of international law.  It should suffice to note 
that the debate exists, and to describe the assumptions underlying the 
positions taken herein. 
F.  Conclusion 
All of the arguments outlined above attempt to reconcile a deep 
dissonance.  A fundamental norm of international law prohibits the 
unauthorized use of force even when force would protect other 
fundamental norms of international law and political morality.  
Underlying the torturous readings, the pleas to changing custom, the 
references to a hyper-flexible, quasi-legal conversation, is a sense that 
international law is too fragile to survive that dissonance.  Internal 
contradictions must be explained away, no matter how convoluted the 
explanations, because otherwise the strain would cause a 
breakdown.160  But this insistence on fragility does a deeper disservice 
                                                        
indiscriminate use of chemical weapons against civilians in a way that threatens a century-
old ban, and the growing likelihood of regional insecurity.”).   
 158.  The South Summit notes that:  
We reaffirm that in our endeavors we are guided by all the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations Charter and by full respect for the principles of 
international law. To this end we uphold the principles of sovereignty and 
sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity and non intervention in the 
internal affairs of any State; . . . refrain in international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations . . . . 
Group of 77 South Summit, supra note 119. 
 159.  See generally Koh, supra note 29.  Koh, for instance, sets up an opposition between 
“per se illegality”—by which he means the clear, strong, and broad prohibition on the use 
of force in the Charter and in customary international law—and the moral and policy 
considerations favoring intervention.  He reconciles the two by the simple expedient of 
asserting that the latter trumps the former.  Id. 
 160.  To continue with the psychological metaphor, that insistence could also be seen as 
a form of “gaslighting,” where someone is told over and over that they do not see what 
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to international law by depriving it of the opportunity to confront, 
and possibly transcend, its contradictions.  “Protecting” international 
law from its perceived weakness keeps it weak, ambiguous, malleable 
and therefore vulnerable to power. 
III.  CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
This Part offers a theory that characterizes an internationally 
wrongful act as an act of international civil disobedience, or 
something similar to it, provided that it is public, in the sense of 
transparent (non-secret) and also in the sense of being an act of 
public reason; conscientious; nonviolent to the maximum extent 
possible; and, loyal to the law in the sense that the disobedient state 
accepts the legal consequences of its actions.  This sets an 
appropriately high bar, one that benefits states that choose to meet it 
but that remain concerned about establishing a permissive 
precedent.161 
Awful choices abound under the analysis in Part II, above.  To 
intervene in Syria, the United States would have to advance a faulty 
reading of the Charter and/or subsequent custom that purports to 
find formal justification for some forms of intervention, endorse an 
instrumentalist conception that subordinates international law to the 
non-legal judgments of states, ignore the Charter and resurrect the 
long-dead doctrine of reprisals, or attack without any pretense of 
justification (“illegal but legitimate”).  Each of those choices 
undermines the prohibition on the use of force and de-legitimizes 
international law by showing it to be at best unable to constrain the 
behavior of its subjects or at worst a mask for power.  But to refrain 
from intervening also risks de-legitimizing international law by 
showing it to be unable to implement the fundamental moral 
commitments of its constituents in the international community.  
There is, however, a way not only to avoid the dilemma, but also to 
ultimately strengthen international law. 
The solution is to offer a theory based on civil disobedience and 
use it to design a blueprint for a civilly disobedient and military 
intervention.  Theories of civil disobedience distinguish it from other 
forms of illegal behavior, such as ordinary offenses (shoplifting, for 
                                                        
they do, in fact, see until they doubt their own perceptions.  Into the space created by that 
doubt steps the “gaslighter,” who by that exercise of power gets to substitute his own 
vision.  Powerful states have much to gain by insisting on the ambiguity and elasticity of 
international law. 
 161.  Recall that this was explicitly the concern of the United States in Kosovo.  
Matheson, supra note 126. 
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instance) or rebellion, because it is deeply loyal to the law.  That 
loyalty manifests itself in different ways according to different 
theorists.  For the most part this Article will rely on a Rawlsian theory 
of civil disobedience.  This is in part because his is one of the most 
widely cited theories,162 but also because his emphasis on the nature 
of civil disobedience as an act of public reason offers significant 
assistance to the attempt to develop a theory that understands the 
unauthorized use of force by one or more states against another as 
supporting the rule of international law. 
Adapting theories of civil disobedience to the international 
system presents a number of serious problems.  Perhaps the most 
significant is that civil disobedience has generally been understood to 
be the province of the oppressed, a way for the powerless to affect the 
powerful.  Ascribing the ability to engage in civil disobedience to the 
world’s only superpower, or to other powerful states, clearly cuts 
against the intuition that it is a tool of the downtrodden.  Further 
complicating the matter, the theory advanced in this Article purports 
to encompass large-scale violence.  Yet civil disobedience is widely 
thought to require nonviolence.163  Although the requirement is not 
absolute for some, it nonetheless remains a strong preference.164  
Highlighting the relative power differential between protesters and 
the strong states likely to engage in unauthorized intervention, the 
latter may well escape legal sanctions for their actions while the 
former may not.  Many of these potential objections stem from the 
nature of states, as opposed to individuals, as the relevant actors.  
That states are the actors in the theory outlined herein gives rise to 
another problem.  Civil disobedience so far has been understood as a 
phenomenon restricted to constitutional democracies where the 
moral and political consensus underlying the state is sufficiently 
robust to make moral claims on citizens that compete with the moral 
                                                        
 162.  See, e.g., Civil Disobedience, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience (last updated Dec. 20, 2013) (“On 
the most widely accepted account of civil disobedience, famously defended by John Rawls 
(1971), civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law 
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies.”).  
Even after fifty years, scholars with differing views are careful to distinguish themselves 
from Rawls.  See A. John Simmons, Disobedience and Its Objects, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1805, 1809 
(2010). 
 163.  See John Rawls, Definition and Justification of Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 106 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991); see also John Morreall, The 
Justifibility of Violent Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra, at 130, 130; 
Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.  
 164.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 226–43 (1979); John Morreall, supra note 
163. 
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imperative to obey the law.  This leaves open the question of whether 
the international system can be understood to support the practice. 
In setting out the theory, the following sections attempt to 
answer these objections.  To the extent that those attempts are 
unsuccessful, however, the argument also stands as an analogy that 
draws on some elements of civil disobedience to describe a way in 
which states may disregard international law in a principled way—
even if that principled disregard falls short of the “gold standard” of 
civil disobedience.  Although the term “international civil 
disobedience” is used frequently on its own, it should be understood 
in each instance to encompass the “lesser included” standard of 
principled disregard. 
A.  Is Civil Disobedience Restricted to Constitutional Democracies? 
Civil disobedience is a way to resolve the conflict of duties where, 
on the one hand, one may have a duty to obey the laws—say, in a 
constitutional democracy or some other political order with a 
measure of legitimacy—but where, on the other hand, one may have 
a competing duty to “defend one’s liberties and . . . oppose 
injustice.”165  This is a remarkably similar tension to the one that arises 
when considering unauthorized intervention in cases of massive 
human rights abuses.  Caution is in order, however.  It is always 
tempting for anyone writing about international law to simply import 
ideas developed to describe domestic systems into the international 
sphere.  Readers should always view that enterprise with skepticism.  
International law is different in kind than the national law of states.  
John Austin famously expressed doubt about the conceptual 
possibility of international law, since it lacked the character of 
enforceable commands issued by a sovereign.166  Other scholars 
disagree, of course, and Tom Franck argued that international law—
then in the early days of its post-Cold War renaissance—had “entered 
its post-ontological era.”167  The fundamental difference of 
international law from other, more recognizable, systems of law is 
precisely what has given rise to the competing conceptions described 
above as formalism and instrumentalism.  Certainly civil disobedience 
would be nonsensical under an instrumentalist conception of 
international law, where there is at best a weak duty to comply with 
                                                        
 165.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 103. 
 166.  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 171 (Wilfrid E. 
Rumble ed., 1995). 
 167.  FRANCK, supra note 150, at 6; see also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).   
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the law. Under that conception there would be no need for an 
elaborate theory of civil disobedience, or for adherence to the 
requirements of that theory for the sake of validating the dissenting 
act. 
Whether disobedience can even make any sense in the context of 
the non-democratic international system must be answered before 
moving on.  Most theorists discuss civil disobedience as something 
that occurs in a constitutional democracy, and thereby distinguish it 
from resistance to anti-liberal, oppressive rule.168  To discern whether 
international law might nonetheless “qualify” despite its dissimilarities 
it is worth taking a closer look at why constitutional democracies 
support the practice of civil disobedience.  Rawls, for instance, 
suggests that civil disobedience stems from perceived transgressions 
of shared fundamental principles of justice: 
[T]his theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly 
just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in 
which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do 
occur.  Since I assume that a state of near justice requires a 
democratic regime, the theory concerns the role and the 
appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately 
established democratic authority.169 
But notice the direction of Rawls’s reasoning here.  It does not 
seem to be constitutional democracy qua constitutional democracy 
that gives rise to the possibility of civil disobedience.  Rather it seems 
that a nearly just society imperfectly organized according to some 
basic principles of justice that can be appealed to when that 
imperfection manifests itself: 
[O]ne invokes the commonly shared conception of justice 
that underlies the political order.  It is assumed that in a 
reasonably just democratic regime there is a public 
conception of justice by reference to which citizens regulate 
their political affairs and interpret the constitution.  The 
                                                        
 168.  In cases of oppressive societies, basic freedoms are not respected and equality is 
not guaranteed.  One is free to rebel against such oppression.  As Rawls succinctly puts it, 
“[t]here is no difficulty about such action in this case.”  Rawls, supra note 163, at 103; see 
also Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra note 
163, at 28, 28; Jürgen Habermas, Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic 
Constitutional State, 30 BERKELEY J. SOC. 95 (1985); see generally CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN 
FOCUS supra note 163. 
 169.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 103. 
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persistent and deliberate violation of the basic 
principles . . . invites either submission or resistance.170 
Constitutional democracy just happened to be the only type of 
social organization Rawls considered, at the time, to have those 
features.  The question then becomes whether the international 
system is based on sufficiently shared principles of justice such that 
when the institutions created to implement them fall short 
international civil disobedience becomes possible. 
Answering that question requires either choosing an existing 
theory of international law or advancing a new one.  The latter is far 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Since his is the most influential 
account of civil disobedience, it is worth examining whether on 
Rawls’s own account international law would be sufficiently robust to 
support civil disobedience.  However, accepting the possibility of 
international civil disobedience does not require accepting Rawls’s 
particular theory.  Since the possibility of civil disobedience rests on 
the existence of sufficiently strong and sufficiently shared normative 
commitments, any theory that would either find those in the abstract 
(liberal cosmopolitanism) or derive them from social facts 
(positivism) would suffice.  The question of whether such 
commitments would include military intervention to stop atrocities is, 
of course, a separate question.171 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls takes the position that the 
international system rests on shared basic principles of justice, from 
which position it follows that the system is “just enough” to support 
international civil disobedience.  Rawls posits an international 
original position from which basic principles of justice would emerge 
that would regulate interactions among peoples.172  He is quite 
                                                        
 170.  Id. at 106. 
 171.  See infra Part IV. 
 172.  For reasons that are not relevant in the present context, Rawls chooses the term 
“peoples” as opposed to the term “nations.”  RAWLS, supra note 167.  For the sake of 
fidelity Rawls’s terminology will be followed here.  For a more thorough discussion of the 
distinction see id.  The Law of Peoples received much criticism.  While many are from 
commentators who doubt the validity of the liberal internationalist enterprise, many are 
from “internal” critics who justifiably take issue with Rawls’s narrow and restrictive list of 
basic principles and his cursory treatment of the limited set of human rights he 
recognizes.  The intent here is not to endorse Rawls’s limited and unnecessarily 
paternalistic cosmopolitanism but rather to show that the international system as he 
conceives it supports the practice of civil disobedience as he conceives it—both in the 
general sense and in the specific case of an otherwise conscientious U.S. military 
intervention in Syria.  See William Magnuson, The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of 
Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection Under International Law, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 255, 
294–95 (2010).  
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cautious about the nature of such principles, and of the type of 
cooperation they would engender.  Specifically he follows Kant, and 
many others, in believing a world state to be undesirable in theory 
and impossible in practice.  He withholds judgment about what types 
of institutions a well-organized society of peoples might create, but 
does note that “there will be many different kinds of organizations 
subject to the judgment of the Law of Peoples and charged with 
regulating cooperation among them and meeting certain recognized 
duties.”173  In short, Rawls does not understand the law of peoples as 
being restricted to a small set of normative commitments (the basic 
principles of justice) but rather believes that those normative 
commitments will be implemented through a set of cooperative 
institutional arrangements.  Since it is precisely in the gap between 
fundamental normative commitments and their implementing 
institutional arrangements (laws, regulations, and policies) that one 
finds the justification for civil disobedience, it seems that Rawls might 
acknowledge the possibility that a specific institutional 
arrangement—such as, for instance, the voting structure of the 
Security Council that might frustrate the achievement of one of the 
basic principles. 
Rawls puts forward eight principles for ordering the 
international basic structure, of which the fourth is particularly 
important in the present context: “Peoples are to observe the duty of 
nonintervention (except to address grave violations of human 
rights).”174 
B.  Political and Public 
The international system in general supports the practice of 
international civil disobedience, and R2P in particular describes a 
moral commitment which, if not implemented, would justify specific 
acts of disobedience.  Importantly, looking at international practice 
through the lens of civil disobedience allows a shift away from 
attempts to glean a legal justification from the documentary and 
diplomatic history of R2P and toward a re-reading of that history as 
evidence of a common political commitment.  A purely legal analysis 
restricts one’s attention to the legal texts and to the force of those 
texts.  The nature of customary international law certainly widens the 
scope beyond written texts by requiring consideration of both the 
behavior and attitudes of states.  But this includes only a very small set 
                                                        
 173.  RAWLS, supra note 167, at 36. 
 174.  Id. at 37. 
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of attitudes, ones that express opinio juris.  As shown above, there is 
little to find in that regard, and attempts to read more strongly 
expressed moral and policy considerations into the law fail insofar as 
they slide into instrumentalism, subordinate international law to the 
non-legal judgments of states, and leave interveners open to charges 
of being more concerned with power than with law.  Attempting to 
understand whether unauthorized military intervention can qualify as 
international civil disobedience, however, directs attention precisely 
to the existence and nature of bedrock principles and the extent to 
which laws and policies reflect them. 
The essence of civil disobedience and what distinguishes it from 
other forms of unlawful activity is that it is, fundamentally, an act of 
public reason.  It is a plea to the majority to reconcile a law, 
regulation, or policy that is, in the protester’s view, contrary to the 
basic principles of justice to which both the protester and her 
audience adhere.  In the present context that law would be the 
Charter system’s restriction of the use of force to self-defense or 
intervention authorized by the Security Council, which by its 
unreasonable restriction of legal discourse to bygone binaries 
prevents the international community from acting on its deeper 
commitment to protecting human rights.  Civil disobedience is 
therefore political in the sense that it appeals to common political 
commitments and not to particular conceptions of the good.175  
Individual religious beliefs, policy preferences, or personal moral 
preferences would not be sufficient to qualify an unlawful act as civil 
disobedience.176  That is because the liberal society of states admits of 
multiple reasonable conceptions of the good, including several 
competing religious doctrines, and does not favor one over the other. 
Civil disobedience on this view is a liberal rather than a radical 
act. It seeks to engage with, to reform, but ultimately to uphold the 
existing order. In contrast, radical action would seek to disrupt, 
dismantle, and replace the existing order with something else. The 
disobedient and her audience share similar normative commitments 
although they may disagree on the appropriate way to implement 
those commitments. This shared commitment to common norms is 
an important component of the argument that civil disobedience 
serves to strengthen and stabilize, rather than harm, the system in 
which it is deployed. 
                                                        
 175.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 105–06. 
 176.  Id.  For Martin Luther King, Jr., on the other hand, religious belief certainly 
justified civil disobedience.  Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.  
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What if any common principles of (international) political 
morality could be the subject of appeal in an instance of civilly 
disobedient military intervention?177  R2P is just such a principle.  As 
shown in Part I.A., above, over the course of two decades nearly every 
member state of the United Nations has signed on to a series of 
declarations and resolutions affirming their common commitment to 
recognizing that every member of the international community has an 
obligation to protect civilians from mass atrocities. 
There are also reasons in theory to believe that any “just enough” 
international system would include some version of R2P.  Returning 
to The Law of Peoples, Rawls examines the international basic structure, 
the set of institutions that together comprise the international 
system.178  He contends that, just as with any domestic system, the 
international basic structure must be justified with respect to certain 
underlying principles.  Those principles include the following: 
1.  Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
2.  Peoples have a right to self-defense but no right to instigate 
war for reasons other than self-defense. 
3.  Peoples are to honor human rights.179 
At first glance the principles of non-intervention and self-defense 
would seem to preclude using military force to remedy gross human 
rights violations.  However, Rawls acknowledges that the list is 
incomplete.  He specifically mentions that “[a] principle such as the 
fourth—that of non-intervention—will obviously have to be qualified 
in the general case of outlaw states and grave violation of human 
rights.”180  Rawls does not elaborate much on the justifications for 
humanitarian intervention, but does offer some hints that are 
particularly relevant in the present context: 
 Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in 
the Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for 
war and its conduct, and they specify limits to the regime’s 
internal autonomy.  In this way they reflect the two basic and 
historically profound changes in how the powers of 
sovereignty have been conceived since World War II.  First, 
war is no longer an admissible means of government policy 
                                                        
 177.  In the domestic case, Rawls limits the principles that might give rise to justifiable 
civil disobedience to violations of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, but 
excludes violations of the difference principle on the basis that violations of the latter are 
much more difficult to discern.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 108–09. 
 178.  RAWLS, supra note 167. 
 179.  Id. at 37. 
 180.  Id. 
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and is justified only in self-defense or, in grave cases of 
intervention to protect human rights.181 
Later he explicitly considers the question of “whether it is ever 
legitimate to interfere with outlaw states simply because they violate 
human rights, even though they are not dangerous and aggressive 
towards other states, and indeed may be quite weak.”182  He answers in 
the affirmative: “Is there ever a time when forceful intervention might 
be called for?  If offense’s against human rights are egregious and the 
society does not respond to the imposition of sanctions, such 
intervention in the defense of human rights would be acceptable and 
would be called for.”183 
But civil disobedience is not only concerned with the features of 
the social system in which it takes place.  Equally important is the 
extent to which the disobedient is acting in good faith. 
C.  Conscientiousness 
Good faith, although it stems from the internal state of mind of 
the actor purporting to be engaged in civil disobedience, must be 
demonstrated by objective acts indicating conscientiousness.  Those 
include exhausting non-disobedient avenues184 and being willing to 
accept the legal consequences of the disobedient act.185  The 
conscientiousness requirement in general stems from the nature of 
civil disobedience as an act of public reason, one that ultimately seeks 
to support and affirm the system it aims at—unlike radical action or 
rebellion seeking to dismantle the existing order.  That is, as an act of 
public reason, civil disobedience must be public (non-secret), have a 
publicly announced justification, and be in furtherance of public 
principles of justice as opposed to individual moral beliefs or naked 
self-interest.  Since the basic principles of justice are, presumably, 
openly available, one might assess the conscientiousness of a potential 
disobedient (in part at least) by the extent to which her announced 
justification actually conforms to existing principles of justice.  But is 
that enough?  What if she is lying? 
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 183.  Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
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The objective requirements of conscientiousness help the 
disobedient actor’s audience evaluate her sincerity, since no one can 
know her subjective intent.186  In the case of international civil 
disobedience the audience would be the organs of the international 
system, such as the United Nations, and other states.  In front of such 
an audience, objectively defined criteria of good faith become even 
more important than in the case of individuals—particularly where 
the actor claiming conscientiousness is one of the powerful states that 
tend to engage in unauthorized military intervention.  In the case of 
Syria, for instance, many states have already questioned the good faith 
of the United States.187  This is true both in light of its past breaches 
of the prohibition on the use of force and in light of its persistent 
refusal to offer a detailed justification of its potential intervention in 
Syria.  Russia and China, for instance, take issue with the extent of 
military operations in Libya, which in their view, significantly 
overreached the modest confines of action authorized—with their 
acquiescence—by the Security Council.188  They have made it clear 
that in their view such overreaching constituted bad faith and that the 
U.S. position on Syria in the Security Council is similarly in bad 
faith—specifically, that the United States is seeking apparently modest 
resolutions that it intends to use as the basis, however farfetched, for 
military intervention.189  If the United States were to announce its 
understanding that unauthorized military intervention in Syria is 
illegal under international law but required by the common moral 
commitments of the international community, it would sap much of 
                                                        
 186.  Id. at 107 (“No doubt it is possible to imagine a legal system in which 
conscientious belief that the law is unjust is accepted as a defense for noncompliance.  
Men of great honesty with full confidence in one another might make such a system work.  
But as things are, such a scheme would presumably be unstable even in a state of near 
justice.  We must pay a certain price to convince others that our actions have, in our 
carefully considered view, a sufficient moral basis in the political convictions of the 
community.”). 
 187.  Elizabeth Djinis, Protestors Argue Against U.S. Intervention in Syria, DUKE CHRONICLE 
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2013/09/10/protesters-argue-
against-us-intervention-syria; Wadah Khanfar, Syrians Want Rid of President Assad, but Without 
U.S. Bombs, GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/02/syrians-rid-assad-without-us-
bombs; Michael T. Klare, Why the Push for Syrian Intervention Is About More Than Just Assad, 
THE NATION (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/176100/why-push-
syrian-intervention-about-more-just-assad#. 
 188.  Micah Zenko, By Overreaching in Libya, NATO Has Left Syria to Fend Alone, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/nato/overreaching-libya-nato-has-
left-syria-fend-alone/p26153.  
 189.  China, Russia Snub UN Security Council Talks on Syrian Aid, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1425867/china-russia-
snub-un-security-council-talks-syrian-aid. 
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the strength from such accusations.  But even with such an 
announcement, if the United States were to violate international law 
with impunity it would be extremely difficult to avoid the perception 
that the military intervention—no matter how well justified as a 
matter of political morality—was an exercise of unaccountable power. 
It is therefore critically important that states purporting to 
engage in international civil disobedience accept the legal 
consequences of their disobedient acts.  Recall that the theory of 
international civil disobedience is aimed at states that wish to uphold 
international law even while responding to moral imperatives that 
international law inadequately implements.  Violating the law with 
impunity has the opposite effect; instead of demonstrating the 
disobedient state’s fealty to international law, it reinforces widely held 
perceptions that international law is a weak constraint ultimately 
subordinate to the preferences of states190 or simply a disingenuous 
mask for power.191  The antidote to those critiques, and a necessary—
though not sufficient—characteristic of international civil 
disobedience is therefore that the disobedient state submit voluntarily 
to international adjudication.   
Institutively it may not seem to be enough merely to submit to a 
legal process that may or may not result in sanctions.  Certainly 
Dr. King, as reflected in the opening quotation of this Article, 
believed that jail time serves the important purpose of highlighting 
the injustice that was the subject of the protest.  But it is not clear that 
actual sanctions—as opposed to a demonstrated willingness to risk 
such sanctions—are required for an act to be considered civil 
disobedience.  Conceptually, to the extent that the acceptance of 
legal consequences is intended to demonstrate fealty to the system 
then putting oneself at the mercy of that system—whatever the 
outcome—would certainly demonstrate that fealty.  Analogically, it 
seems unlikely that we would take away from protesters who take to 
the streets the mantle of civil disobedient simply because the city 
where they were protesting chose to “catch and release” rather than 
press charges.  The United States might therefore be understood to 
satisfy this criterion by submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
                                                        
 190.  See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 
AND PEACE (2d ed. 1954); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 260 (1940). 
 191.  CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS 
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (2003). 
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even if the ICJ ultimately imposes no sanction.  As discussed in more 
detail below, this can be accomplished by accepting the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ for disputes arising from the unauthorized military 
intervention. 
None of the foregoing guarantees that all acts of international 
civil disobedience will be undertaken in good faith.  Neither this 
suggestion nor civil disobedience theories more generally can fully 
account for instances where someone is lying about the justification 
for their actions or has ulterior motives for undertaking the conduct 
in question.  But the requirements of civil disobedience, taken as a 
whole, set an extremely high bar for the conduct of either persons or 
states. Someone (or some state) acting in bad faith would, one 
imagines, find it difficult to declare their justification—publicly 
broadcasting a lie far and wide—and to submit, again publicly, to 
adjudication of those acts.  Furthermore, in the case of international 
law, a state that lies about the justification for its actions risks 
contributing to the creation of new customary international law based 
on its untruthful opinio juris—an outcome it would likely wish to 
avoid.  But even if a state believes in good faith that unauthorized 
military intervention is necessary to vindicate important shared 
principles of international justice, can violent civil disobedience ever 
be justified? 
D.  (Non) Violent? 
If R2P qualifies as a basic principle of justice, and the principle 
itself contemplates violence under some circumstances, then violent 
international civil disobedience in support of that principle must, at 
least under some circumstances, be justified. That position runs 
contrary to much of the thinking on civil disobedience,192 although a 
minority view holds violence to be at least sometimes justified.193  The 
hesitation of theorists opposed to violence, however, seems to be 
more a strong presumption than an a priori position that it is 
categorically prohibited.194  The question then becomes whether that 
presumption can be overcome. 
                                                        
 192.  See, e.g., MAHATMA GANDHI, ALL MEN ARE BROTHERS 85–107 (Krishna Kripalani 
ed., 2d ed. 1969); Rawls, supra note 163; see generally Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra 
note 1; CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra note 163.   
 193.  Joseph Raz, for instance, raised the question of why, if an act of civil disobedience 
were to be justified at all—a very high bar, considering the inherent illegality of the act—
violence would automatically be unjustified.  Joseph Raz, Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra note 163, at 159. 
 194.  Rawls, for instance, takes violence to obscure the communicative nature of the act:  
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A novel question for civil disobedience theory, which arises from 
the case of the United States and Syria, suggests how the presumption 
against violence might be overcome: What if basic principles of justice 
required violence, and the law prohibited that required violence?195  
Suppose, for instance, that in the Jim Crow South a county or 
municipality passed a law prohibiting third parties from interfering 
with a lynching.  Suppose further that outraged locals formed an anti-
lynch mob with the publicly expressed intention to forcibly prevent 
any further lynching in that town.  If the anti-lynch mob violently 
clashed with a lynch mob, succeeding in rescuing the potential victim, 
would that violence obscure the communicative nature of the rescue?  
Suppose the lynch mob was ready for its opponents, who were 
arrested after a scuffle, and that the murder then proceeded as 
planned.  It seems counterintuitive to assert that being arrested in the 
course of trying to prevent a cold-blooded murder would not be at 
least as communicative of the absurdity of the law as would an 
unsanctioned protest on the steps of City Hall.  If the members of the 
anti-lynch mob then stood trial and accepted the legal consequences 
of their actions, would the fact of their violence undermine their 
claim to fealty to the law? 
On this view the Assad regime’s murder of tens of thousands of 
civilians and its displacement of millions more create a moral 
obligation, stemming from fundamental principles of justice, to use 
violence.  The implementation of that obligation is frustrated by the 
operation of law.  Surely in such a situation accomplishing the 
violence required by principle but prevented by law would demonstrate, 
rather than detract from, fidelity to the rule of law? 
                                                        
[Civil disobedience] tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against persons, 
not from the abhorrence of the use of force in principle, but because it is a final 
expression of one’s case.  To engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is 
incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address.   
Rawls, supra note 163, at 106.  Habermas is also concerned with the communicative nature 
of civil disobedience (which he terms “symbolic”) and similarly eschews violence.  
Habermas, supra note 168. 
 195.  Although early Rawls opposed violent civil disobedience, later Rawls argued that 
some basic principles of justice require it.  See Rawls, supra note 163, at 106 (“To engage in 
violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of 
address.”).  The Law of Peoples explicitly lists violence against illiberal regimes committing 
massive human rights violations as a basic principle of international justice.  RAWLS, supra 
note 167, at 93–94 n.6 (“Is there ever a time when more forceful intervention might be 
called for?  If the offenses against human rights are egregious and the society does not 
respond the imposition of sanctions, such intervention in defense of human rights would 
be acceptable and would be called for.”).  Rawls’s own position in The Law of Peoples 
therefore casts doubt on the applicability of his objection, on the grounds of fidelity, to 
violent civil disobedience.  
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E.  Conclusion 
Civil disobedience stabilizes and strengthens the system of which 
it is a part.  “Indeed, civil disobedience . . . is one of the stabilizing 
devices of a constitutional system, although by definition an illegal 
one.”196  In that sense international civil disobedience is the opposite 
of the move to define away problematic applications of international 
law; to argue for the possibility of international civil disobedience is to 
argue that international law is robust enough to confront its 
contradictions head on.  The stabilizing effect stems from the 
distinguishing feature of an almost just society, as opposed to, for 
instance, a monarchy based on divine right or an illiberal society 
based on autocratic rule: the free and freely chosen cooperation 
among individuals garnered by the attractiveness of shared basic 
principles of justice.197  A consequence of basing a society on such 
freely chosen cooperation is the freedom of individual members of 
that society to express their discontent with the current form of that 
cooperation.  But that is not to say that members of constitutional 
democracies, or states in the international system, are free to disobey 
the law at any time or for any reason.  That would negate the concept 
of law and undermine fidelity to the rule of law.  Rather, it is to say 
that when specific institutional expressions of that core agreement 
divert from its content, then actors should be free to disagree.  The 
following Part will outline just what such a disagreement would look 
like under the theory of international civil disobedience. 
IV.  BLUEPRINT FOR CIVILLY DISOBEDIENT MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Had the United States done nothing differently than it did, 
except followed through with its intention of using force against Syria, 
that act would already have shared many of the above-described 
characteristics of civil disobedience.  It would have been transparent, 
at least arguably within the boundaries of qualifying violence, 
conscientious, and public in the sense of transparency.  But it would 
not, without more, have been public in the sense of a communicative 
act designed to perfect a mostly just system, nor would it have served 
to strengthen the rule of law.  This Part will sketch some ideas about 
what more the United States, or any potential future belligerent, 
could do to make sure its acts are understood to be international civil 
disobedience and thereby preserve the rule of international law in the 
face of extra-Charter violence. 
                                                        
 196.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 114; see also Habermas, supra note 168, at 95–116. 
 197.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 114. 
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A.  Going Public 
To qualify unauthorized military intervention in Syria as civil 
disobedience, the United States would need to make it clear to the 
world that its actions were motivated by public principles of justice as 
opposed to private morality, policy, or naked self-interest.  As a 
preliminary matter, that would require the Obama administration to 
release a detailed justification for military intervention, something 
that at the time of this writing it has not done.198  The world has 
therefore been left to puzzle out possible justifications based on hints 
dropped by a number of officials in speeches and interviews. 
The next question would then be whether the United States 
would be “invok[ing] the commonly shared conception of justice that 
underlies the political order.”199  This narrows the options for the 
United States.  President Obama’s contention, for instance, that the 
Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons would justify the use of force 
to degrade its ability to do so and to deter future use would not likely 
pass muster unless an argument could be constructed that the 
international community has come together to reintroduce the 
principle of armed reprisals.  This is where reframing the history of 
humanitarian intervention and R2P as the emergence of a moral 
principle rather than a legal one pays off.200  R2P can be understood as 
the articulation by the international community of one of its core 
principles.  Certainly, proponents of the doctrine see it that way. 
B.  Accepting the Consequences 
To demonstrate its fidelity to the law, the United States would 
need to accept the legal consequences of conducting unauthorized 
military interventions against Syria.  The most straightforward way for 
it to do that would be to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ for 
contentious cases arising from its intervention, but the ICJ is far from 
the only possible forum.  A brief review of practice in the twentieth 
century reveals several creative approaches to interstate dispute 
                                                        
 198.  Koh, supra note 29 (“Given the importance of the issue, it is critically important 
that the Obama Administration soon issue its detailed legal opinion elaborating her view.  
Why not explain—not just in lay terms as President Obama recently did, but in legal 
language that international lawyers can debate (as the U.K.’s Attorney General did in Syria 
and in Kosovo)—why a limited use of force in extraordinary circumstances can fit within a 
legitimate process of reconstructing international law?”).  
 199.  Rawls, supra note 163, at 106.  Recall that for Rawls this is a very high standard—he 
even excluded his own difference principle from consideration as a motivation for 
justified civil disobedience.  Id. 
 200.  See supra Part II.A. 
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resolution.  Since the theory of civil disobedience calls for fidelity to 
the law, and not necessarily to any particular legal institution, the 
United States would seem to be free to choose the forum.201  The ICJ 
is, however, the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”202 
and it provides an authoritative and ready-made forum.  Acceptance 
of the jurisdiction of the ICJ is voluntary,203 and neither the United 
States nor Syria has agreed to compulsory jurisdiction.204 
Submission of a dispute to the ICJ would therefore require an 
affirmative act on the part of the United States (and also on the part 
of Syria, but we are here concerned only with understanding how the 
United States might engage in international civil disobedience).  
Such an affirmative act would significantly strengthen the claim of the 
United States to fealty to the law.  One way for the case to come to the 
ICJ would be through a special agreement where the parties (the 
United States and Syria) jointly refer the case to the Court as 
contemplated under Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (“the Statute”).205  But that option has the drawback 
of requiring the United States to negotiate with Syria, which might be 
difficult in the aftermath of an attack.  In the alternative, the United 
States could make a declaration under the Optional Clause of the 
Statute (Art. 36 paragraph 2),206 which would allow it to tailor its 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to cover only the 
timeframe of its unauthorized intervention, only disputes arising from 
                                                        
 201.  Some choices, such as international arbitration, would also give the parties control 
over the applicable law.  It is an interesting question, albeit one beyond the scope of this 
Article, the extent to which the United States could modify the applicable law and still be 
said to be expressing fealty to it.  And what role would Syria’s hypothetical consensus have 
on that question? 
 202.  ICJ Statute, supra note 101, 59 Stat. at 1055. 
 203.  Article 36 of the ICJ’s Statute provides, in pertinent part, that:  
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it 
and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
treaties and conventions in force.  
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they 
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to 
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all 
legal disputes . . . . 
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on 
condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain 
time.   
Id. at 1060.  
 204.  Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2014). 
 205.  ICJ Statute, supra note 101, 59 Stat. at 1060. 
 206.  Id. 
  
2015] INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 371 
that intervention, only disputes initiated by Syria, or any combination 
of those or other conditions.207  Even if Syria never initiated 
proceedings, the United States would satisfy the criterion of accepting 
the legal consequences of its acts by opening itself up to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, since if Syria did bring a case, the United 
States would be compelled to participate. 
In any case before the ICJ, the United States would have to 
concede the unlawfulness of its actions but could at the same time 
argue that it should not have to pay damages to Syria because the 
latter would lack standing based on the doctrine of unclean hands.  
The concept of civil disobedience requires the disobedient actor to 
believe that her action is, in fact, illegal,208 and the analysis provided 
above in Part II shows that to be the case.  Furthermore, the very 
nature of customary international law requires a state concerned to 
maintain the cohesion of the prohibition on the use of force to avoid 
appearing to endorse its customary modification.  That is because 
customary international law changes only over time and only once a 
general practice and accompanying opinio juris have crystallized, 
which necessarily implies a period of experimentation during which 
states would use force illegally.209  To change customary international 
law you have to break existing international law.210  Weakening the 
                                                        
 207.  The plain text of Articles 36(2) and 36(3) might give the impression that a state 
can only impose certain narrow restrictions on its acceptance.  However,  
[t]he two World Courts have never taken such a restrictive view.  From the early 
days of the PCIJ, States engaged in a practice of carefully defined reservations 
suiting their individual needs, as perceived by them. . . . In sum, the freedom of 
States to confine the scope of their declarations . . . may perhaps have certain 
ultimate limitations, but such limitations are no more than a theoretical 
construct, lacking any relevance in practice.   
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 683 (Andreas 
Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).   
 208.  Rawls noted that “the civilly disobedient act is indeed thought to be contrary to 
law, at least in the sense that those engaged in it are not simply presenting a test case for a 
constitutional decision; they are prepared to oppose the statute even if it should be 
upheld.”  Rawls, supra note 163 at 105. 
 209.  Koh, supra note 29 (“In the future, other less-humanitarian minded states can cite 
Obama’s threat and put their own broad spin on the legal interpretation, to use the murky 
concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P for their own self-interested purposes.”).  
Koh is here referring to the result of conducting unauthorized humanitarian intervention 
without announcing any justification, but it would apply equally well to the likely extended 
period of time where customary international law was in the process of evolving.   
 210.  See Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 136 (J.L. 
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (“[H]eavy reliance on customary law, absence 
of a sovereign universal legislature, and the obvious limitations of the treaty process 
together result in a system in which reform without illegality is more difficult than in 
domestic systems.”).   
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prohibition on the use of force in that way is precisely the result the 
theory presented in this Article seeks to avoid.  By acknowledging the 
illegality of its actions under international law, and highlighting the 
incompatibility of that illegality with the principle of R2P, the United 
States would “arouse the conscience of the [international] 
community over its injustice”211 and thereby hasten other avenues of 
legal reform.  But acknowledging responsibility does not necessarily 
mean that the United States would have to pay damages to Syria. 
The United States could argue that the doctrine of “clean hands” 
bars Syria’s claims for damages even if the United States conceded 
responsibility.212  Although the principle is not universally understood 
to apply in international law, the Court has applied versions of it in 
the past, and has never declared it inapplicable despite several 
opportunities to do so.  As Stephen Schwebel, himself a former judge 
on the ICJ, nominated by the United States, noted: 
The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing 
cases in which an argument of clean hands has been 
invoked: (a) a number of States have maintained the vitality 
and applicability of the principle of clean hands in inter-
State disputes; and (b) the ICJ has not rejected the principle 
though it has generally failed to apply it.  In the Meuse Water 
case, the PCIJ embraced a related principle, and in the Case 
concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ gave 
expression to the principle ex injuria jus non oritur.213 
Others are less cautious.214  Clearly Syria’s hands are “odiously 
unclean.”  The Assad regime has repeatedly violated international 
                                                        
 211.  Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1. 
 212.  See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 156 (Stevens & Sons 1953)) (“A Party who asks for redress must 
present himself with clean hands.”); Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine 
in International Law, 7 INTER ALIA 39, 39 (2010). 
 213.  STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FURTHER SELECTED 
WRITINGS 300–01 (2011); see also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 420–21 (1947) (“The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is one of the fundamental 
maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a source of legal right to 
the wrongdoer.”). 
 214.  Schwebel himself endorsed the principle much more strongly in his dissenting 
opinion in Nicaragua.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 268 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (“Nicaragua has not 
come to Court with clean hands.  On the contrary, as the aggressor, indirectly 
responsible—but ultimately responsible—for large numbers of deaths and widespread 
destruction . . . .  Nicaragua’s hands are odiously unclean . . . .  Thus . . . Nicaragua’s 
claims against the United States should fail.”); see also Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic 
Protection, Sixth Rep. on Diplomatic Protection, ¶ 6, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/546 (Aug. 11, 2004) (by John Dugard) (“The . . . cases make it difficult to sustain 
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law, thereby creating the very situation that invited intervention 
(according to a principle that Syria itself agreed to on more than one 
occasion).215  The United States would therefore be in a position to 
argue that Syria should not have the standing to claim damages for 
acts occasioned by its own illegal conduct.216  If ever the Court were to 
reject a state’s standing for unclean hands, the case of Syria or, by 
implication, of future states subject to unauthorized military 
intervention to stop mass atrocities, would be the opportune time to 
do so. 
C.  But Is It Practicable? 
Following the blueprint set forth above would offer several 
practical benefits to the United States.  Setting international civil 
disobedience as the standard for justified unauthorized military 
intervention would set a high bar for other states to follow and would 
serve as a deterrent for states acting in bad faith.  The Court’s 
rejection of Syria’s standing for unclean hands would not only save 
the United States from the paradoxical result of having to pay to 
rebuild that which it had just destroyed, but it would also serve as a 
moral vindication for the United States; a vindication in which one 
could imagine other international bodies and members of the 
international community joining.217  That victory would arouse the 
conscience of the international community, would grant the United 
States the moral high ground in future discussion about the use of 
force, and would allow it to lead the way to a more just institutional 
arrangement. 
Furthermore, acknowledging the illegality of its unauthorized 
military intervention would be the only way for the United States to 
maintain the status quo while reform efforts are underway.  The 
hesitation of the United States to publicly announce a legal, as 
                                                        
the argument that the clean hands doctrine does not apply to disputes involving direct 
inter-State relations.”). 
 215.  Recall that the World Summit Outcome was a consensual resolution.  See supra 
Part II.A.  
 216.  “Thus a State which is guilty of illegal conduct may be deprived of the necessary 
locus standi in judicio for complaining of corresponding illegalities on the part of other 
States, especially if these were consequential on or were embarked upon in order to counter its own 
illegality—in short were provoked by it.”  Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of 
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, in 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 
1, 119 (1957) (emphasis added). 
 217.  Tom Franck argued that the international community already exercises this 
approval (or disapproval where warranted) of unauthorized interventions, and that in that 
way it functions as something analogous to a jury.  FRANCK, supra note 11. 
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opposed to moral or policy justification for attacking either Kosovo or 
Syria (saying that there is such a justification, but refusing to share it, 
does not count) could be read as a desire to prevent other states from 
using it as a basis to launch their own attacks.  But as the continuing 
debates generated by Kosovo have shown, intervening without 
announcing a justification creates ambiguity.  Intervening while 
announcing a specious justification, on the other hand, would tarnish 
the reputation of the United States as a law abiding member of the 
international community, undermine the prohibition on the use of 
force, and risk the specious justification acquiring the status of 
customary international law.  Only acknowledging that the 
intervention is illegal removes ambiguity while blocking the 
emergence of new customary international law. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
States do not have to choose between the apparently conflicting 
moral imperatives to stop mass atrocities and to uphold the rule of 
law.  Rather, they can engage in international civil disobedience, or 
the principled disregard of international law,  and thereby “break[]” 
international law while “expressing the highest respect for 
[international] law.”218  This is not a permissive standard, however.  
Engaging in international civil disobedience requires states to be 
public and transparent about their motivations, to demonstrate good 
faith by appealing only to basic shared principles of justice (and not 
to self-interest), and to accept the legal consequences of their actions 
by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ (or another adjudicatory 
body).  The ICJ, for its part, would be called on to determine whether 
the target state committed mass atrocities that precluded its recovery, 
based on the principle of clean hands, despite the illegality of the 
intervention. 
The theory set forth in this Article, if put into practice by the 
United States and other states that might be tempted to engage in 
unauthorized military intervention, would have a profound effect on 
the world order.  The U.S. Department of State was divided on 
intervention in Kosovo.  The policy officials wanted it but the legal 
officers refused to certify its legality.219  The result was also divided—
an intervention with a justification in policy but not in law.  In turn, 
that divided result gave rise to persistent ambiguity and confusion 
                                                        
 218.  Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.   
 219.  David Kaye, who served at the time in the Office of the Legal Adviser (though not 
on the Kosovo issue), has recently written about this.  See Kaye, supra note 91.   
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about a norm that should be sharp and clear: the prohibition on the 
use of force.  Removing that division and clarifying that ambiguity 
might encourage more intervention by well-intentioned states while 
setting the bar too high for ill-intentioned states to meet.  
Undertaking unauthorized military intervention as international civil 
disobedience will remove the whiff of illegitimacy that has always 
accompanied the practice and strengthen the international 
community’s ability to stop mass atrocities and end the conflicts that 
give rise to them. 
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